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WEISNER REVISITED: A REAPPRAISAL OF
A CO-OP'S POWER TO ARBITRARILY
PROHIBIT THE TRANSFER OF ITS SHARES
I. Introduction
The statute which prohibits discrimination in co-operatives because
of race, color, religion, national origin or ancestry is not involved
in this case. Absent the application of these statutory standards
. . . there is no reason why the owners of the co-operative
apartment house could not decide for themselves with whom they
wish to share their elevators, their common halls and facilities,
their stockholders' meetings, their management problems and re-
sponsibilities and their homes.'
With its decision in Weisner v. 791 Park Avenue Corp.' the New
York Court of Appeals firmly established that absent discriminatory
practices prohibited by law,3 a cooperative 4 housing' corporation 6
1. Weisner v. 791 Park Ave. Corp., 6 N.Y.2d 426, 434, 160 N.E.2d 720, 724,
190 N.Y.S.2d 70, 75 (1959).
2. 6 N.Y.2d 426, 160 N.E.2d 720, 190 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1959).
3. There are several statutes which prohibit discrimination in the sale of
cooperative interests:
A cooperative housing corporation may not withhold its consent to the sale or
proposed sale of an ownership interest due to the race, creed, national origin or
sex of the purchaser. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 19-a(l) (McKinney 1976).
It is unlawful "[tlo refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer,
or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable
or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin." Fair Housing Act of 1968, § 804, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (1982). For purposes
of the statute, the word "dwelling" applies to cooperative apartment buildings.
Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032, 1036 (2d Cir. 1979).
In addition to the above-mentioned criteria, the New York State Human Rights
Law prohibits the denial of or withholding from any person or group a housing
accommodation based on the age, disability or marital status of the purchaser.
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(5)(a)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1986). An aggrieved party has
the option of filing a complaint with the New York State Division of Human
Rights, or bringing an action in state court. Id. § 297(9) (McKinney 1982). If he
chooses the former, he may not bring an action in state court unless the human
rights division dismisses the complaint on the ground of administrative convenience.
Id. If he brings an action, he may not later resort to the administrative remedies
provided by statute. Id. §§ 297(9), 300.
Whether section 19-a and section 296 both apply to cooperative housing cor-
porations is unclear in New York. Section 19-a of the Civil Rights Law was enacted
to "expressly prohibit real estate cooperatives, their shareholders and their man-
agement from withholding consent to the sale of certificates of stock . . .by reason
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of the race, creed, national origin or sex of the purchaser." 1971 McKinney's Sess.
Laws at 2611-12 (Memorandum of Governor Rockefeller); see also Sanders v.
Winship, 57 N.Y.2d 391, 395, 442 N.E.2d 1231, 1233, 456 N.Y.S.2d 720, 722
(1982) (statute enacted to combat specified discrimination in sale of cooperative
interests). At the time of its enactment, section 19-a prohibited the same discrim-
inatory acts as section 296 of the Executive Law. Compare 1971 N.Y. Laws ch.
376, § 5 and 1970 N.Y. Laws ch. 807, § 1. However, the Executive Law was
subsequently amended to prohibit discrimination on the grounds of disability, 1974
N.Y. Laws ch. 988, § 7, marital status, 1975 N.Y. Laws ch. 803, § 10, and age,
1983 N.Y. Laws ch. 657, § 1. The Civil Rights Law remains unchanged to this
date. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 19-a (McKinney 1976).
In Emil v. Dewey, 66 A.D.2d 758, 411 N.Y.S.2d 865 (1st Dep't 1978) (mem.),
aff'd on other grounds, 49 N.Y.2d 968, 406 N.E.2d 744, 428 N.Y.S.2d 887 (1980),
the court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint, which alleged that his purchase of a
cooperative apartment had been denied on account of his marital status, a dis-
criminatory act under section 296 of the Executive Law. The plaintiff intended to
reside in the apartment with a woman and her daughter. Since section 19-a of the
Civil Rights Law does not prohibit discrimination based on marital status, the
court held that the complaint failed to state a cause of action against the cooperative.
66 A.D.2d at 758-59, 411 N.Y.S.2d at 865. The New York Court of Appeals
affirmed the dismissal, on the ground that the plaintiff had violated the admin-
istrative scheme of the Executive Law, but it did not express any opinion as to
the applicability of the statute to cooperatives. 49 N.Y.2d at 969, 406 N.E.2d at
745, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 887. Thus, the question remains as to whether the additional
prohibitions contained in the Executive Law apply to cooperatives. See Emil v.
Dewey, 66 A.D.2d at 758, 411 N.Y.S.2d at 865 (Kupferman, J.P., dissenting in
part); Margolies, Increasing Number of Cooperatives Produces High Volume of
Litigation, N.Y.L.J., June 6, 1984, at 24, col. 2 [hereinafter cited as Margolies];
Wise, Co-op Tyranny-How the Boards of Directors Rule the Roost, NEW YORK
MAGAZINE, April 22, 1985, at 45, col. 2 [hereinafter cited as Co-op Tyranny]. But
see Rogers v. 66-36 Yellowstone Boulevard Coop. Owners, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 79,
80 n.2 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (plaintiff charging cooperative apartment building with
racial discrimination in disapproving apartment purchase recovered under 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981, 1982, 3612 and New York State Executive Law § 296); Ikegami v. 40
West 24th St. Corp., No. 84 Civ. 3990 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 1984) (available on
LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (unmarried plaintiffs alleged that their application
to purchase an apartment was rejected due to their race and marital status; claims
were brought under federal fair housing laws and New York State Executive Law
§ 296); Murphy v. 253 Garth Tenants Corp., 579 F. Supp. 1150, 1155 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) (court, in ruling on plaintiffs' pendent state claim, considered all discriminatory
grounds enumerated in section 296 and applied them to cooperative housing cor-
poration); Bachman v. State Div. of Human Rights, 104 A.D.2d 111, 114, 481
N.Y.S.2d 858, 860 (1st Dep't 1984) (court applied both section 19-a of the Civil
Rights Law and section 296(2-a) of the Executive Law to publicly-assisted cooperative
housing corporation; thus, it is "unlawful for [the cooperative] to discriminate
solely because of the age, sex or marital status of the applicant").
A New York court, relying on the appellate division's decision in Emil v. Dewey,
recently dismissed a cause of action, holding that the Civil Rights Law controls
over the Executive Law. Pardy v. Fountainhead Owners Corp., N.Y.L.J., Oct. 2,
1985, at 14, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County). The plaintiff had alleged that
her purchase application was rejected by the cooperative's board of directors solely
on the basis of the age of her daughter, who was five and one half years old.
Id. The action was dismissed because it alleged discrimination based on age, which
[Vol. XIV
CO-OP TRANSFERS
is behavior prohibited under the Executive Law, but permissible under the Civil
Rights Law. The legislative history of the bill outlawing age discrimination under
the Executive Law suggests that this provision applies to rental housing only. 1983
McKinney's Sess. Laws at 2792 (Memorandum of Governor Cuomo).
Clearly, a residential cooperative housing corporation fits within the definition
of "housing accommodation" to which section 296 applies: "The term 'housing
accommodation' includes any building, structure, or portion thereof which is used
or occupied or is intended, arranged or designed to be used or occupied, as the
home, residence or sleeping place of one or more human beings." N.Y. EXEC.
LAW § 292(10) (McKinney 1982).
Whether or not the New York State Legislature had originally intended that the
Executive Law apply to cooperatives, it has recently taken steps to explicitly extend
that statute's coverage to such dwellings. A. 6824, a bill introduced in the 1985
legislative session, provides that all of the provisions relating to discrimination in
section 296 of the Executive Law be made applicable to both cooperative and
condominium apartments. A. 6824, 208th Sess. (1985), STATE OF NEW YORK LEGISLATIVE
DIGEST A585-86 (1985). It would repeal section 19-a of the Civil Rights Law. The
bill was passed by the Assembly, and forwarded to the Senate for approval. Id.
This is not the first time that such legislation has been introduced in the Legislature.
See A. 694-d, 207th Sess. (1984), NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE RECORD AND INDEX
A41 (1984); Co-op Tyranny, supra, at 45, col. 3. However, the bill died in the state
senate on January 8, 1986, and has once again been sent back to the Assembly.
A. 6824, 209th Sess. (1986). STATE OF NEW YORK LEGISLATIVE DIGEST A414 (1986).
In addition, the 1985 legislative session moved to restrict a cooperative's ability
to withhold its consent to a transfer of its units on other grounds. See A. 571,
208th Sess. (1985), STATE OF NEW YORK LEGISLATIVE DIGEST AS0 (1985) (discrim-
ination based on affectional or sexual preference); A. 848, 208th Sess. (1985), STATE
OF NEW YORK LEGISLATIVE DIGEST A73 (1985) (discrimination based on lawful
source of income); A. 854, 208th Sess. (1985), STATE OF NEW YORK LEGISLATIVE
DIGEST A74 (1985) (requiring a cooperative to provide an applicant with the reason
for his rejection); A. 1010, 208th Sess. (1985), STATE OF NEW YORK LEGISLATIVE
DIGEST A87 (1985) (discrimination based on occupation); A. 4026, 208th Sess.
(1985), STATE OF NEW YORK LEGISLATIVE DIGEST A344 (1985) (discrimination based
on disability) (amending section 19-a of the Civil Rights Law); A. 6824, 208th
Sess. (1985), STATE OF NEW YORK LEGISLATIVE DIGEST A585-86 (1985) (discrimination
because an individual has or will have children); A. 7045, 208th Sess. (1985), STATE
OF NEW YORK LEGISLATIVE DIGEST A610 (1985) (discrimination based on sexual
orientation); Brooks, Co-ops Warned on Rejections, N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1984,
§ 8 (Real Estate), at 12, col. 2 [hereinafter cited as Co-ops Warned on Rejections].
These bills were all passed by the Assembly, but died in the Senate on January
8, 1986. They have all been redelivered to the Assembly. See 209th Sess. (1986),
STATE OF NEW YORK LEGISLATIVE DIGEST A37, A56, A57, A66, A249, A414, A427 (1986).
It is interesting to note that these restrictions would be enacted as additional
discriminatory practices under section 296 of the Executive Law, not the Civil
Rights Law. See Assembly Bills, supra. Should all the proposed legislation but A.
6824 be enacted into law, the applicability of these provisions to cooperatives would
be highly questionable in light of the decision in Emil v. Dewey. This could occur
even though the bill requiring a written reason for rejecting an applicant was
expressly drafted to combat discriminatory practices by cooperatives. Telephone
Interview with Mr. Dan Conviser, legislative assistant to Assemblyman Alexander
Grannis (Nov. 4, 1985).
The Administrative Code of the City of New York contains provisions which
are virtually identical to the New York State Human Rights Law. Chapter 1,
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section BI-7.0(5)(a) prohibits the denial or withholding of a housing accommodation
due to the race, creed, color, national origin, sex or marital status of a person.
NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE ch. I, § BI-7.0(5)(a) (1976). Since there is no com-
parable provision to section 19-a of the Civil Rights Law in the Administrative Code,
it is arguable that aggrieved parties may have an actionable complaint under this
section if they are discriminated against based on their marital status. Cf. Emil v.
Dewey, 66 A.D.2d at 759, 411 N.Y.S.2d at 865 (Justice Kupferman notes that plaintiff
alleged discriminatory behavior in violation of section BI-7.0(5)(a).
Absent the initiation of an action in state supreme court by the Human Rights
Commission, the statute only provides for administrative remedies. See Bachrach
v. 1001 Tenants Corp., 21 A.D.2d 662, 249 N.Y.S.2d 855 (1st Dep't 1964), aff'd,
15 N.Y.2d 718, 205 N.E.2d 196, 256 N.Y.S.2d 929 (1965); NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN.
CODE ch. 1, § BI-8.0 (1976). Although the complaining party may seek judicial
review of the commission's determination in state supreme court, these findings
will not be set aside unless they are not supported by "sufficient evidence." NEW
YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE ch. I, § BI-9.0 (1976). Sufficient evidence has been
interpreted to mean substantial evidence. State Div. of Human Rights v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 55 A.D.2d 842, 390 N.Y.S.2d 332 (4th Dep't 1976).
4. For the purposes of this Note, the term "cooperative" refers to a cooperative.
apartment building. "A cooperative apartment is a multi-unit dwelling in which,
as a general rule, each resident has (1) an interest in the entity owning the building
evidenced by his stock subscription or share, and (2) a proprietary lease entitling
him to occupy a particular apartment within the building." Sanders v. Tropicana,
31 N.C. App. 276, 280, 229 S.E.2d 304, 307 (1976).
5. A recent decision raised the possibility that Weisner's grant of arbitrary
discretion to prohibit transfers might not apply to a "cooperative commercial
corporation." See Vinnik v. 795 Fifth Ave. Corp., 94 A.D.2d 685, 463 N.Y.S.2d
10 (1st Dep't 1983), aff'd, 62 N.Y.2d 698, 465 N.E.2d 45, 476 N.Y.S.2d 538 (1984).
The defendant cooperative housing corporation in Vinnik had been formed to
acquire the Hotel Pierre so that its tenant-shareholders could use the Pierre's rooms
and suites for residential purposes. Id. at 685, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 10. However, the
Pierre continued to operate as a hotel after the purchase by the corporation. While
some shareholders chose to use the Pierre as their residence, others sublet their
rooms to the management of the hotel, who in turn rented them to guests in the
ordinary course of the hotel's business. The Pierre continued to solicit as much
business as possible in order to maximize profits. When the defendant's board of
directors refused to consent to the sale of their interests, the plaintiff tenant-
shareholders sought an injunction directing the board to approve the transfers. Id.
at 685, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 11.
It has been stated that the purchasers of a cooperative apartment are concerned
primarily with the purchase of a home. Penthouse Properties, Inc. v. 1158 Fifth
Ave., Inc., 256 A.D. 685, 691, Il N.Y.S.2d 417, 422 (1st Dep't 1939) (see infra
notes 42-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Penthouse Properties deci-
sion). However, the tenant-shareholders in Vinnik were found by the court to have
a dual objective: providing residences and profitably running a public hotel. 94 A.D.2d
at 686, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 11. Thus, the issue was raised as to whether Weisner should
apply to the defendant, since the relationship between the shareholders of a cooperative
commercial corporation and those of a cooperative housing corporation may in fact
warrant different treatment regarding the ability of the board of directors to withhold
consent to a transfer. Id. See infra notes 42-56 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the considerations involved in the special relationship between tenant-shareholders
in a cooperative housing corporation.
This residential/commercial distinction has been previously applied in New York in
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may arbitrarily7 prohibit the transfer of a tenant-shareholder's in-
terest.' This issue had been left unanswered by an earlier appellate
division decision, 9 where that court, in upholding the validity of
share transfer restrictions on cooperative stock, 0 had explicitly re-
served judgment on this question.' However, it became clear after
the context of a landlord's power to arbitrarily withhold his consent to an attempted
assignment or sublease by a tenant. See Kruger v. Page Management Co., 105
Misc. 2d 14, 20, 432 N.Y.S.2d 295, 300 (1980), appeal dismissed, 80 A.D.2d 525
(Ist Dep't 1981); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 226-b(l) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985);
Comment, The Approval Clause in a Lease: Toward a Standard of Reasonableness,
17 U.S.F.L. REV. 681, 688-89 (1983). In the case of a commercial tenant, when
the lease contains an express covenant prohibiting assignments or subleasing without
prior consent, the landlord may arbitrarily withhold consent for any or no reason.
Arlu Assocs. v. Rosner, 14 A.D.2d 272, 220 N.Y.S.2d 288 (1st Dep't 1961),
aff'd, 12 N.Y.2d 693, 185 N.E.2d 913, 233 N.Y.S.2d 477 (1962). However, the
landlord may generally withhold consent to an assignment or sublease of a residential
lease only on reasonable grounds. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 226-b(1) (McKinney
Supp. 1984-1985).
6. "The corporate-proprietary lease form of organization, although not the
only form that a cooperative may take, is the type most frequently employed in
the development of cooperative projects." 2 P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, COOPERATIVE
HOUSING LAW AND PRACTICE § 2.02(4)(a), at 2-16 (1986) [hereinafter cited as
COOPERATIVE HOUSING LAW]. For a discussion of the other methods of cooperative
organization, see 4B R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 633.2, 633.3 (P.
Rohan ed. 1985) [hereinafter cited as POWELL]; Comment, A Survey of the Legal
Aspects of Cooperative Apartment Ownership, 16 U. MIAMI L. REV. 305, 305-10
(1961) [hereinafter cited as Survey of Legal Aspects].
7. When used in the context of this Note, the term "arbitrary" refers to the
unreasonable withholding of consent, in light of the "economic and social purposes
of cooperative ownership," to a sale of a cooperative unit by a tenant-shareholder.
This is the test adopted by other jurisdictions examining the validity of alienation
restraints on cooperative units. See infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
8. The tenant-shareholder owns a block of shares corresponding to the value
of, and allocated to, the apartment he will occupy from the corporation holding
title to the building. The shares entitle the shareholder to a long-term apartment
proprietary lease. His rights as a tenant are initiated by the capital investment
made in the shares of the cooperative corporation. State Tax Comm'n v. Shor,
43 N.Y.2d 151, 156, 371 N.E.2d 523, 526, 400 N.Y.S.2d 805, 807 (1977); Co-
OPERATIVE HOUSING LAW, supra note 6, § 2.02(4)(a), at 2-16; Note, Legal Char-
acterization of the Individual's Interest in a Cooperative Apartment: Realty or
Personalty?, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 250, 250 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Realty or
Personalty?.
9. Penthouse Properties, Inc. v. 1158 Fifth Ave., Inc., 256 A.D. 685, 11
N.Y.S.2d 417 (1st Dep't 1939).
10. Id. at 692, 11 N.Y.S.2d at 423. Penthouse Properties is the seminal case
in New York upholding the validity of transfer restrictions on a tenant-shareholder's
interest. For a discussion of this decision, see infra notes 42-56 and accompanying
text.
11. 256 A.D. at 692, 11 N.Y.S.2d at 423.
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Weisner that the board of directors or the other tenant-shareholders 2
could withhold consent to any transfer, 3 for any or no reason.' 4
12. The certificate of incorporation and by-laws typically provide that there can
be no transfer of shares or lease by a tenant-shareholder without the consent of
the directors or a specified portion of the tenant-shareholders. Realty or Personalty?,
supra note 8, at 258; Survey of Legal Aspects, supra note 6, at 310-11. For a
situation where the purchaser was approved by the tenant-shareholders after being
turned down by the board, see Ebner v. 91st St. Tenants Corp., 126 Misc. 2d
108, 481 N.Y.S.2d 198 (1984).
13. When .used in the context of this Note, the term "transfer" refers to the
voluntary alienation of a tenant-shareholder's entire interest in the corporation.
The right of the tenant-shareholder to sublet his apartment is not addressed in this
Note. However, it should be noted that this right is also subject to the same
transfer restrictions as the assignment of cooperative interests. Alexy v. Kennedy
House, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 690, 699-700 (E.D. Pa. 1981); see Mowatt v. 1540 Lake
Shore Drive Corp., 385 F.2d 135, 137 (7th Cir. 1967) (court, in applying Illinois
law found in Gale v. York Center Community Coop., Inc., 21 Ill. 2d 86, 171
N.E.2d 30 (1960), held that board of directors' consent to proposed sublease or
assignment can be withheld only on some "reasonable basis in light of the significant
needs and purposes of the cooperative arrangement"); Kohler v. Snow Village,
Inc., 16 Ohio App. 3d 350, 475 N.E.2d 1298 (1984) (corporate policy forbidding
subletting reasonable in order to carry out cooperative purpose); see also Zuckerman
v. 33072 Owners Corp., 97 A.D.2d 736, 737, 468 N.Y.S.2d 639, 641 (1st Dep't
1983) (cooperative shareholders do not have absolute right to sublet subject only
to board approval of prospective sublessee); Tsimis v. Rudnick, Brett, Wyckoff,
Inc., 59 A.D.2d 871, 399 N.Y.S.2d 239 (1st Dep't 1977), aff'd, 45 N.Y.2d 976,
385 N.E.2d 628, 412 N.Y.S.2d 891 (1978) (no absolute right to sublet subject to
only board approval); Sanders v. Tropicana, 31 N.C. App. 276, 284, 229 S.E.2d
304, 309 (1976) (intention of proposed assignee to sublet his apartment is reasonable
basis on which to reject purchase application, in light of co-op's policy limiting
occupancy to owners). But see Logan v. 3750 North Lake Shore Drive, Inc., 17
111. App. 3d 584, 590, 308 N.E.2d 278, 282-83 (1974) (plaintiff tenant-shareholder's
claim that attempted sublease was refused without any consideration of proposed
sublessee's qualifications, but based on long-established policy of the building to
deny such requests, sufficient to establish prima facie case of arbitrary and un-
reasonable withholding of consent by defendant's board of directors; defendant
was precluded from raising on appeal that nature of cooperative ownership required
policy limiting occupancy to owners); Crossman v. Pease & Elliman, Inc., 29
A.D.2d 4, 7, 284 N.Y.S.2d 751, 754 (1st Dep't 1967), aff'd, 26 N.Y.2d 855, 258
N.E.2d 95, 309 N.Y.S.2d 600 (1970) (pursuant to provision in purchase contract,
tenant-shareholder had absolute right to sublet, subject only to board approval of
social desirability and financial responsibility of prospective subtenants; policy of
denying subleases was neither provided for in the proprietary lease, "nor is it one
of the general conditions which provide a basis for approval of restriction on the
right to sublease").
Although a co-op may.require that it consent to any transfer, it may not prohibit
the transfer of a tenant-shareholder's interest that occurs by operation of law. See,
e.g., House v. Lalor, 119 Misc. 2d 193, 198, 462 N.Y.S.2d 772, 776 (1983) (co-
op may not prevent title transfer to creditor who properly executes on property;
however, it still has right to approve creditor or transferee of creditor before either
takes occupancy).
14. Generally, New York courts will not inquire into the reasonableness of a
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At a time when the New York courts continue to follow Weisner's
mandate, 5 the cooperative form of home ownership is flourishing
in New York.' 6 The number of offering plans submitted for con-
version to cooperative housing units increased tenfold in New York
State from 1976 to 1981. 7 According to a recent study, New York
cooperative's rejection of an applicant in the absence of allegations charging sta-
tutorily prohibited discrimination. See infra note 15 and accompanying text. A
noteworthy exception to this rule can be found in Frymer v. Bell, 99 A.D.2d 91,
472 N.Y.S.2d 622 (1st Dep't 1984).
In Frymer, the plaintiff had exercised her option to purchase a proprietary lease
for her apartment in connection with her building's plan for cooperative conversion.
In addition, she contracted with a fellow tenant to purchase the latter's apartment
upon the conversion for her grandchildrens' use. Id. at 92, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 623.
The plaintiff was assigned the second proprietary lease on the date the conversion
plan became effective, notwithstanding the fact that the transaction required approval
of the corporation's board of directors or tenant-shareholders. Id.
When the board was finally elected, it refused to approve the transfer of the
second apartment to the plaintiff because she had failed to pay a "flip tax" on
the sale. Id. The board members also asserted that even if this tax had been paid,
they would have disapproved the purchase on several other grounds, including the
fact that the plaintiff had been illegally subletting the apartment to her grandchildren
prior to board approval. Id. While the lower court had found the flip tax to be
illegal, it ruled that the board's decision, " 'regardless of how illogical or irrational,'
must be upheld insofar as it is not proscribed by law. Id.
After finding the cooperative's other claims to be without merit, the appellate
division addressed the board's contention that the application would have been
denied based on the illegal sublet. The court summarily dismissed this claim, noting
that "the record contained no derogatory data, financial or otherwise, about these
grandchildren who had previously been living with [the plaintiff] in her own
apartment." Id. at 97, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 626. Only after the plaintiff had indicated
that she would not pay the transfer fee did the board indicate that it would withhold
consent to the transfer, and the court found the stated reasons for rejection to
be mere pretext, Id. In essence, the court had ruled that the cooperative could
not reasonably withhold its consent to a transfer of the apartment based on the
qualifications of the grandchildren.
15. Bachman v. State Div. of Human Rights, 104 A.D.2d 111, 114, 481 N.Y.S.2d
858, 860 (1st Dep't 1984); Goldstone v. Constable, 84 A.D.2d 519, 443 N.Y.S.2d
380 (1st Dep't 1981); Gorman v. Presidential Towers Residence, Inc., N.Y.L.J., Oct.
4, 1976, at 6, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County). The New York Court of Appeals has
apparently had several opportunities to overrule Weisner in subsequent cases, but
to this date has failed to do so. See, e.g., Girard v. 94th St. & Fifth Ave. Corp.,
530 F.2d 66, 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 974 (1976) (court describes history
of state court proceeding of same action in which Court of Appeals denied leave
to appeal from decision following Weisner).
16. See generally Johnson, From Brooklyn to Jersey, an Abundance of Units,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1985, § 12 (Real Estate Report on Co-ops and Condominiums),
at 34, col. I (discussing why this will be the "biggest year for the production of
new apartments since the early 1960's").
17. Note, Examining Cooperative Conversion: An Analysis of Recent.New York
Legislation, 11 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1089, 1101 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Co-
operative Conversion).
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City is the national leader in cooperative housing, containing 95%1o
of such units located in the United States. 18
This trend toward cooperative ownership is occurring at a time
when there is a critical shortage of adequate, affordable rental
housing in New York City. 19 In fact, it is the concern of some
writers and legislators that the ever-increasing number of conversions
to cooperative housing is, in itself, contributing to this problem.20
As competition for new units intensifies, cooperative boards are
subjecting prospective tenant-shareholders to increasing scrutiny be-
fore they approve a transfer of any apartment. 2' As the stock of
available rental housing decreases even further and the number of co-
operative residences continues to rise, the ability of the board or the
remaining tenant-shareholders to arbitrarily prohibit the transfer of
cooperative apartments will undoubtedly have an increasing effect on
the availability of apartment housing in New York City.2
In light of these developments, there is presently a movement in
18. See OFFICE OF POLICY AND DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING
AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, THE CONVERSION OF RENTAL HOUSING To CONDOMINIUMS
AND COOPERATIVES, PUB. No. PB81-118234, A NATIONAL STUDY OF SCOPE, CAUSES
AND IMPACTS XI-1 (1980) [hereinafter cited as HUD STUDY].
19. A survey conducted by the New York City Census Bureau found that only
2.04 percent of the city's housing stock was vacant in 1984, compared with a figure
of 2.13 percent in 1981 and 2.95 percent in 1978. A five percent vacancy rate is
considered desirable in an urban setting. See Failure of Homeless Plan Reflects
Housing Crisis, N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1985, at B5, col. I [hereinafter cited as
Housing Crisis]; deCourcy Hinds, Adapting to the High Cost of Housing, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 3, 1985, § 8 (Real Estate), at 1, col. 1.
20. See Carmody, Hard to Find, Harder to Afford: A Decent Manhattan
Apartment, N.Y. Times, July 19, 1984, at BI, col. 5; Housing Crisis, supra note
19, at B5, col. 1. But see Cooperative Conversion, supra note 17, at 1103 (referring
to HUD Study stating that during the 1970's, only 0.72 percent of available occupied
rental housing stock in New York City was lost due to condominium and cooperative
conversions).
21. See generally Wedemeyer, Co-ops Tighten Standards for Buyers, N.Y. Times,
July 8, 1984, § 8 (Real Estate), at 1, col. I (describing admissions policies and
extensive procedures applicants are subjected to by co-op boards) [hereinafter cited
as Co-ops Tighten Standards]; Lifton, What Boards Should Ask, N.Y. Times, Oct.
6, 1985, § 12 (Real Estate Report on Co-ops and Condominiums), at 64, col. 3
[hereinafter cited as Liftonl. See infra notes 183-86 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the negative impact of these detailed procedures on the investigatory
practices of human rights agencies.
22. See Johnson, The 'Lumpy' Co-op Market Gets Tougher to Track as It
Grows, N.Y. Times, April 28, 1985, § 8 (Real Estate), at 14, col. I (relating
findings of Census Bureau that private co-ops and condominiums made up nearly
77 percent of vacant New York City housing units for sale in 1984); Co-op Tyranny,
supra note 3, at 36, col. 3 (statement of Mr. Harvey Fisher, member of the New
York City Human Rights Commission, that "[in every borough, every stable
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the New York State Legislature to limit the exercise of discretion
by the board of directors or tenant-shareholders of a cooperative
in denying admission to a prospective purchaser.2" There have been
bills introduced in and passed by the New York State Assembly2 4
which would expand the discriminatory practices prohibited by the
state's Human Rights Law.25 These bills would prohibit discrimination
by cooperatives on the basis of affectional or sexual preference,2 6
lawful source of income, 27 occupation, 28 disability29 or an individual's
having or intending to have children.3" Although the state senate
recently declined to act on these bills, they have all been sent back
to the Assembly for further consideration. a'
This Note will examine the propriety of imposing further restraints
on a New York cooperative's ability to prohibit the transfer of its
shares. Initially, this Note reviews the history of New York case
law delegating broad discretion to a cooperative in selecting its
shareholders.32 In particular, the New York courts' legal character-
ization of a tenant-shareholder's interest33 is analyzed, as this is the
ultimate justification for the far-reaching restraints placed on the
right of alienation of such interests.3 4 This Note then discusses the
policies behind the decisions of other jurisdictions which impose a
reasonableness standard on the board in prohibiting transfers,35 and
compares them to the underlying rationale of Weisner. Finally, this
Note concludes by recommending that the current bills under con-
sideration by the state legislature,3 6 which expand the definition
relatively affordable neighborhood is undergoing tremendous conversion, and that
includes working class communities").
23. See Co-ops Warned On Rejections, supra note 3, at 12, col. 2 (statement
of State Assemblyman Alexander B. Grannis, co-sponsor of bill which would require
co-ops to give reason for rejecting an applicant, that proposed legislation was
reaction to proliferation of co-ops as basic form of housing).
24. See infra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
25. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(5)(a)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1986).
26. A. 571,208th Sess. (1985), STATE OF NEW YORK LEGISLATIVE DIGEST A50(1985).
27. A. 848, 208th Sess. (1985), STATE OF NEW YORK LEGISLATIVE DIGEST A73 (1985).
28. A. 1010, 208th Sess. (1985), STATE OF NEW YORK LEGISLATIVE DIGEST A87 (1985).
29. A. 4026, 208th Sess. (1985), STATE OF NEW YORK LEGISLATIVE DIGEST A344
(1985).
30. A. 6824, 208th Sess. (1985), STATE OF NEW YORK LEGISLATIVE DIGEST A585-
86 (1985).
31. See 209th Sess. (1986), STATE OF NEW YORK LEGISLATIVE DIGEST A37, A56,
A66, A249, A414 (1986).
32. See infra notes 42-69 and accompanying text.
33. See supra note 8.
34. See infra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 70-89 and accompanying text.
36. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
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of prohibited discriminatory practices by cooperatives, be altered to
provide greater recognition to two competing interests: the tenant-
shareholder's right of alienation over his apartment 7 and the co-
operative's privilege of selecting its own members.38 This could be
accomplished by giving statutory recognition to the "reasonableness"
standard used by the courts of other jurisdictions when evaluating
the validity of alienation restraints on cooperative apartments. 9 This
legislation would, in effect, require that a cooperative exercise a
right of first refusal when it withholds consent to a transfer of an
apartment on unreasonable, yet constitutionally permissible40 grounds.
In addition, this Note urges that legislation be adopted which would
require cooperatives to inform applicants of the reason for their
refusal to approve apartment purchases. 41
II. The History Of Judicial Decision In New York
A. Penthouse Properties, Inc. v. 1158 Fifth Avenue, Inc.
In 1939, a New York court ruled for the first time on the validity
of share transfer restrictions on cooperative stock.4 2 This case, Pent-
house Properties, Inc. v. 1158 Fifth Avenue, Inc. ,4 presented a
classic confrontation between two well established policies: (1) the
ability of an owner to transfer corporate stock, which is considered
personalty, and therefore may only be subject to reasonable restraints
on alienation; 44 and (2) a landlord's ability to arbitrarily withhold
consent to an assignment or sublease by a tenant.4 5
The Penthouse Properties court found that the proprietary lease
was the primary interest of a tenant-shareholder when purchasing
an apartment. 46 The stock merely afforded the practical means of
37. See infra notes 76-89 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 90-103 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
40. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 169-98 and accompanying text.
42. Penthouse Properties, Inc. v. 1158 Fifth Ave., Inc., 256 A.D. 685, 690, 11
N.Y.S.2d 417, 421 (1st Dep't 1939).
43. ld.
44. Id. at 690-91, 11 N.Y.S.2d at 422.
45. Id. (citing with approval Ogden v. Riverview Holding Corp., 134 Misc. 149,
234 N.Y.S. 678, aff'd, 226 A.D. 882, 235 N.Y.S. 850 (1st Dep't 1929)). This rule
has been altered in New York State through statutory intervention. See N.Y. REAL
PROP. LAW § 226-b (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985); infra notes 161-62 and accom-
panying text.
46. 256 A.D. at 692, 11 N.Y.S.2d at 423. Since the proprietary lease is deemed
to be the dominant element of cooperative ownership, the characterization of the
486 [Vol. XIV
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combining an ownership interest with a method for proportionately
sharing the assessments and taxes. 47 Since the lease was the pre-
dominant element of cooperative ownership, the stock was not af-
fected by the general rule which prohibits unreasonable restraints
on the sale of stock in corporations organized for profit.
48
The court went to great lengths to distinguish the "special nature"
of cooperative ownership from other forms of home ownership.
Although the tenant-shareholders in a cooperative do not "own"
their apartments, 49 when they purchase an apartment they are in-
terested in the purchase of a home.5 0 In fact, they acquire many
of the advantages traditionally associated with actual home own-
ership." However, unlike the typical homeowner, the amount of a
tenant-shareholder's monthly expenses will depend upon the financial
well-being of his fellow shareholders.52 If one apartment owner
defaults on his share of the monthly charges, 3 the remaining share-
relationship between the corporation and shareholder has been described by some
courts as that of merely landlord and tenant. See infra note 86 and accompanying
text.
47. 256 A.D. at 692, 11 N.Y.S.2d at 423.
48. Id. (citing with approval 68 Beacon St., Inc. v. Sohier, 289 Mass. 354, 194
N.E. 303 (1935)).
49. See State Tax Comm'n v. Shor, 43 N.Y.2d at 156, 371 N.E.2d at 526, 400
N.Y.S.2d at 807-08; People ex rel. McGoldrick v. Sterling, 283 A.D. 88, 93, 1.26
N.Y.S.2d 803, 808 (1st Dep't 1953); Bratt, Cooperative Apartments: A Survey of
Legal Treatment and an Argument for Homestead Protection, 1978 U. ILL. L.F.
761, 772-73 [hereinafter cited as Bratt]. But cf. Silverman v. Alcoa Plaza Assocs.,
37 A.D.2d 166, 173, 323 N.Y.S.2d 39, 46 (1st Dep't 1971) (Steur, J., dissenting)
("[wlhile [co-op] owner does not acquire a fee in the apartment, he does possess
so many of the rights and obligations peculiar to fee ownership that the status is
for practical purposes indistinguishable"); Kohler v. Snow Village, Inc., 16 Ohio
App. 3d 350, 353, 475 N.E.2d 1298, 1301 (1984) ("[wlhile the interest in a cooperative
is something of a hybrid between renting and owning, it would not be incorrect
to state that the similarity is closer to the latter than to the f6rmer"); POWELL,
supra note 6, 1 633.16, at 829 (when analyzing validity of residential restrictions,
"[a] sound argument can be made for treating each cooperative apartment as the
home of its occupant").
50. Penthouse Properties, 256 A.D. at 692, 11 N.Y.S.2d at 423.
51. Among these are the psychological advantages of owning one's home, the
availability of tax deductions for mortgage interest and taxes, the ability to borrow
on the value of one's shares, and the build-up of home equity. See generally Bratt,
supra note 49, at 761-90; California Coastal Comm'n v. Quanta Inv. Corp., 1113
Cal. App. 3d 579, 599 n.17, 170 Cal. Rptr. 263, 274 n.17 (1981).
52. Note, Co-operative Apartment Housing, 61' HARV. L. REV. 1407, 1411: (1948)'
[hereinafter cited as Co-operative Apartment Housing].
53. These charges typically consist of a fixed annual. sum based on mortgage
and operating expenses; a fixed sum! collected for a reserve account used to carry
defaulting tenant-shareholders or to buy back corporate shares; and a sum which
may be levied if the tenant-shareholder fails to maintain the apartment. Bratt,
supra note 49, at 773.
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holders must make up the deficiency.14 This degree of financial
interdependence among the tenant-shareholders is frequently referred
to in court decisions as the "economic purpose" of the cooperative,55
and is the reason the financial status of prospective purchasers is
of such vital concern to a cooperative's members.
The second factor used by the Penthouse Properties court to
justify the imposition of share transfer restraints is the interest of
the tenant-shareholders in establishing a community of homes.56
Indeed, the privilege of selecting one's neighbors was the driving
force behind the initial popularity of cooperatives at the early stages
of their development,5" and continues to be one of the major factors
behind their appeal.5" The right of tenant-shareholders to protect
their investment by controlling membership in the building has re-
ceived judicial recognition.59 This "social purpose" of the cooperative
has come under increasing public scrutiny lately as financially capable
purchasers are left wondering why their applications were rejected
by the board. 611
The Penthouse Properties court expressly refrained from deciding
whether the consent of the directors or shareholders could be withheld
54. See id. at 776 (noting that tenant-shareholders will lose their apartments in
a foreclosure, whether personally delinquent or not, if total assessment collections
do not cover mortgage payments); Co-operative Apartment Housing, supra note
52, at 1411.
55. See, e.g., Mowatt v. 1540 Lake Shore Drive Corp., 385 F.2d 135, 137 (7th
Cir. 1967).
56. Penthouse Properties, 256 A.D. at 692, 11 N.Y.S.2d at 423.
57. See Note, Cooperative Apartments-A Legal Hybrid, 13 U. FLA. L. REV.
123, 124-25 (1960) [hereinafter cited as A Legal Hybrid]; Cooperative Conversion,
supra note 17, at 1096; Co-op Tyranny, supra note 3, at 38, col. 1 (statement of
Gayle Banks, director of New York City real estate brokerage and management
firm, that co-ops were "designed to maintain social exclusivity and financial sound-
ness").
58. See Knox, Why Condos are Edging Co-ops, N.Y. Times, April 14, 1985,
§ 8 (Real Estate), at 14, col. 4 (while condominiums have now surpassed co-ops
in the number of new units being built due to buyer preference, many individuals
still purchase co-ops due to greater control they may exercise over their environment);
Kohler v. Snow Village, Inc., 16 Ohio App. 3d 350, 357, 475 N.E.2d 1298, 1306
(1984) (tenant-shareholder has advantage over ordinary tenant in that he can control
membership in building).
59. See infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
60. See Co-ops Tighten Standards, supra note 21, at 9, col. I.; Lifton, supra
note 21, at 67, col. 2 (referring to the rejections of former President Nixon and
Madonna by co-ops); Co-op Tyranny, supra note 3, at 45, col. 3 ("[s]hould a
financially sound applicant be prevented from buying an apartment because he is
a lawyer, or because he has children, or because he showed insufficient cultural
interests?").
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arbitrarily. 61 It did point out, however, that if a restraint on alienation
of the cooperative stock could be imposed at all, "it is a restraint
which is reasonable and appropriate to the lawful purposes to be
attained." '6 This portion of the opinion has been cited by other courts
"for the proposition that only reasonable restraints on the alienation
of cooperative stock may be imposed,63 a position that was subsequently
rejected by the New York State Court of Appeals in Weisner."
B. Weisner v. 791 Park Avenue Corp.
In Weisner, the plaintiff had entered into a contract to purchase
an apartment from one Gilbert, a tenant-shareholder of the defendant
corporation. After the board of directors had refused to consent to
the transfer and had given no reason for doing so, the plaintiff
brought an action against Gilbert and the corporation for specific
performance of the sales contract. 65
The complaint alleged that the treasurer of the cooperative had
personal animus against the plaintiff's brother and had improperly
used his influence on the other members of the board to negotiate
another transfer wherein he would receive a brokerage fee. 66 Taking
these allegations as true, it is difficult to imagine a situation where
the tenant-shareholder's right of alienation could receive so little
recognition. Yet the court, noting that the requisite approval of the
board or the other tenant-shareholders had not been obtained 67 and
that any allegation of statutorily prohibited discrimination was ab-
sent, 68 dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. 69
61. Penthouse Properties, 256 A.D. at 692, 11 N.Y.S.2d at 423.
62. Id.
63. See Sanders v. Tropicana, 31 N.C. App. 276, 281, 229 S.E.2d 304, 307
(1976); Kohler v. Snow Village, Inc., 16 Ohio App. 3d 350, 355, 475 N.E.2d 1298,
1303 (1984).
64. Weisner v. 791 Park Ave. Corp., 6 N.Y.2d 426, 160 N.E.2d 720, 190
N.Y.S.2d 70 (1959).
65. Weisner v. 791 Park Ave. Corp., 7 A.D.2d 75, 78, 180 N.Y.S.2d 734, 737
(1st Dep't 1958), rev'd, 6 N.Y.2d 426, 160 N.E.2d 720, 190 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1959).
The factual background of Weisner is set out in much greater detail in the appellate
division decision in this case.
66. Id.
67. 6 N.Y.2d at 434, 160 N.E.2d at 724, 190 N.Y.S.2d at 75.
68. The court referred to refusals based on "race, color, religion, national origin
or ancestry." Id.
69. Id. at 435, 160 N.E.2d at 724, 190 N.Y.S.2d at 76.
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I!!. The Tenant-Shareholder and the Cooperative:
Divergent Interests
While the vast majority of cooperative apartments are located in
New York City,70 the validity of cooperative share transfer restrictions
has been litigated in several other jurisdictions.71 When faced with
the same issue, these courts have reached a result contrary to
that of the Weisner court: in the absence of statutorily prohibited
discrimination, they have imposed a standard of reasonableness upon
the board in prohibiting the transfer of a tenant-shareholder's in-
terest." While none of these courts found the board's decision to
be arbitrary and capricious, 3 they recognize that the unchecked ability
70. HUD STUDY, supra note 18, at XI-1.
71. Strauss v. Summerhays, 157 Cal. App. 3d 806, 204 Cal. Rptr. 227 (1984);
Jones v. O'Connell, 189 Conn. 648, 458 A.2d 355 (1983); Gale v. York Center
Community Coop., Inc., 21 11. 2d 86, 171 N.E.2d 30 (1961); Logan v. 3750 North
Lake Shore Drive, Inc., 17 Ill. App. 3d 584, 308 N.E.2d 278 (1974); Mowatt v.
1540 Lake Shore Drive Corp., 385 F.2d 135 (7th Cir. 1967) (applying Illinois law);
68 Beacon St., Inc. v. Sohier, 289 Mass. 354, 194 N.E. 303 (1935); Sanders v.
Tropicana, 31 N.C. App. 276, 229 S.E.2d 304 (1976); Kohler v. Snow Village,
Inc., 16 Ohio App. 3d 350, 475 N.E.2d 1298 (1984); see also In re Estate of
Wartels, 357 So. 2d 708, 709 (Fla. 1978) (court, in describing nature of cooperative
ownership, recognized that transfer of stock and proprietary lease could not be
effected without first obtaining consent of board of directors if such consent was
required by cooperative documents); State ex rel. Leavell v. Nelson, 63 Wash. 2d
299, 387 P.2d 82 (1963) (same).
72. Strauss, 157 Cal. App. 3d at 815-16, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 233; Jones, 189
Conn. at 654-55, 458 A.2d at 358; Gale, 21 IiI. 2d at 92-93, 171 N.E.2d at 33;
Logan, 17 111. App. 3d at 589, 308 N.E.2d at 282; Mowatt, 385 F.2d at 137;
Sanders, 31 N.C. App. at 281, 229 S.E.2d at 307; Kohler, 16 Ohio App. 3d at
355, 475 N.E.2d at 1304; cf. Murphy v. 253 Garth Tenants Corp., 579 F. Supp.
1150, 1155 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (despite broad discretion granted under Weisner, New
York cooperative subjected to reasonableness standard when provision in by-laws
stated that consent to transfer could not be unreasonably withheld); Alexy v.
Kennedy House, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 690 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (provision in by-laws of
non-profit cooperative apartment house giving corporation option to repurchase
shares, if member decides to leave, according to "transfer value formula" found
to be reasonable restriction); Hanigan v. Wheeler, 504 P.2d 972, 975 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1972) (rule of reasonableness in testing alienation restraints adopted in Arizona,
citing with approval Gale and Penthouse Properties); Sunshine Villa Apartments,
Inc. v. Snyder, 335 So. 2d 841, 842 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (reasonableness of
board of directors in withholding consent to transfer of cooperative interest would
have been addressed by appellate court had issue not been rendered moot), appeal
dismissed, 345 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1977).
73. See Jones, 189 Conn. at 657, 458 A.2d at 359-60 (tenant-shareholders sought
to purchase second apartment in co-op which was connected to their present residence
one floor below by common stairway used by all tenant-shareholders; purchase
rejected on ground it would interfere with common use by other tenants); Mowatt,
385 F.2d at 137-38 (rejections based upon insolvency, association with people of
disreputable character and noisiness of proposed sublessees and assignees); Sanders,
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of the board to prohibit transfers for any reason is an unreasonable
restraint on the tenant-shareholder's right of alienation.7 4 They further
agree that such unbridled discretion vested in the board would be
contrary to the public policy encouraging the free alienation of
property.75
A. The "Ownership" Interest Of Tenant-Shareholders
Several commentators have cited what they perceive to be fallacious
reasoning used by some courts in attempting to classify the nature
of a tenant-shareholder's interest.7 6 By attempting to "pigeonhole"
the interest as either realty77 or personalty,"8 commentators suggest
31 N.C. App. at 284, 229 S.E.2d at 309 (rejection of applicant who intended to
sublet apartment before taking occupancy reasonable in light of corporate policy
limiting occupancy to owners); Kohler, 16 Ohio App. 3d at 357, 475 N.E.2d at
1305-06 (practice of denying subleases as matter of corporate policy reasonably
necessary to carry out cooperative purpose); see also Strauss, 157 Cal. App. 3d
at 816 n.7, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 233 n.7 (reasonableness of share transfer restrictions
not addressed by court, since cooperative corporation was not party to action); cf.
Murphy, 579 F. Supp. at 1155-56 (co-op's contention that plaintiff's application
was rejected due to her unresponsiveness and vagueness during interview found to
be insufficient in light of by-law provision stating consent would not be unreasonably
withheld). But see Logan, 17 111. App. 3d at 590, 308 N.E.2d at 283 (rejection of
proposed sublessee without evaluation of his personal qualifications found to be
unreasonable).
74. See, e.g., Jones, 189 Conn. at 654, 458 A.2d at 358; Mowatt, 385 F.2d
at 137; see also RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 406, Comment i, § 410, Comment
g (1944); Weisner, 7 A.D.2d at 86, 180 N.Y.S.2d at 744 (Frank, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that cooperative corporation may owe greater duty to tenant-shareholder
than to prospective purchaser when evaluating transfers of apartments).
75. See Jones, 189 Conn. at 654-55, 458 A.2d at 359; see also Kruger v. Page
Management Co., 105 Misc. 2d 14, 19, 432 N.Y.S.2d 295, 300 (1980) (restrictions
in leases prohibiting subleases or assignments are "restraints on the free alienation
of land and tend to prevent full utilization of the land, which is contrary to the
best interests of society"), appeal dismissed, 80 A.D.2d 525 (1st Dep't 1981);
Manning, The Development of Restraints on Alienation Since Gray, 48 HARV. L.
REV. 373, 401-06 (1935) ("[i]f public interest is served by the free alienation of
property, it is against that interest to enforce the capricious whims of an owner
of property." Id. at 406).
76. POWELL, supra note 6, 633.16, at 829; COOPERATIVE HOUSING LAW, supra
note 6, § 1.03, at 1-7 to 1-8; Bratt, supra note 49, at 780-82; Rohan, Cooperative
Housing: An Appraisal Of Residential Controls And Enforcement Procedures, 18
STAN. L. REV. 1323, 1337 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Residential Controls); Realty
or Personalty?, supra note 6, at 260-64; A Legal Hybrid, supra note 57, at 128
77. See, e.g., In re Estate of Pitts, 218 Cal. 184, 22 P.2d 694 (1933). If a
tenant-shareholder's interest is classified as real property, its alienability should be
unfettered. Bratt, supra note 49, at 784.
78. Silverman v. Alcoa Plaza Assocs., 37 A.D.2d 166, 172, 323 N.Y.S.2d 39,
44-45 (1st Dep't 1971); Susskind v. 1136 Tenants Corp., 43 Misc. 2d 588, 251
N.Y.S.2d 321 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1964).
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that these courts are improperly classifying a property interest which
does not fit conveniently into either category.7 9
The courts of several jurisdictions have been quick to recognize
the sui generis nature of the cooperative interest."0 They note that
a tenant-shareholder's interest is a unique form of property, and
should not be classified as either realty or personalty. 81 Many courts
recognize the self-perception of tenant-shareholders as "owners" of
their apartments, 2 and the reluctance of society to place restraints
on an owner's right to alienate his property.83 Since the cooperative
has a strong interest in the economic and social characteristics of
a tenant-shareholder, restraints may be imposed on the alienation
of his interest.84 However, due to the tenant-shareholder's true status
as an "owner," only reasonable restraints, for example, those that
"serve the reasonable protection of the financial and social integrity
of the cooperative as a whole," 85 will be upheld.
This analysis is not based on any landlord-tenant concept,86 or
79. See articles cited supra note 76; see also Plaza Rd. Coop., Inc. v. Finn,
.201 N.J. Super. 174, 175, 492 A.2d 1072, 1072 (App. Div. 1985) ("cooperative is
frequently described as a building in which each 'tenant' 'owns' an apartment, an
obvious contradiction in terms").
80. Alexy v. Kennedy House, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 690, 697 (E.D. Pa. 1981);
Jones, 189 Conn. at 653-54, 458 A.2d at 358; Plaza Rd. Coop., 201 N.J. Super.
at 178, 492 A.2d at 1075; State Tax Comm'n v. Shor, 43 N.Y.2d at 154, 371
N.E.2d at 524, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 806; Sanders, 31 N.C. App. at 281-82, 229 S.E.2d
at 307-08.
81. See cases cited supra note 80; see also Bratt, supra note 49, at 782; Realty
or Personalty?, supra note 8, at 256-58.
82. Kohler, 16 Ohio App. 3d at 354, 475 N.E.2d at 1302; Jones, 189 Conn.
at 654, 458 A.2d at 358; see also Tudor Arms Apartments v. Shaffer, 191 Md,
342, 62 A.2d 346 (1948); Realty Or Personalty?, supra note 8, at 260, 288; Bratt,
supra note 49, at 775-76; 1971 McKinney's Sess. Laws at 2404 (Memorandum of
State Executive Department) ("[flor the city dweller in particular, the co-op is a
vehicle for obtaining an ownership interest i. is apartment"); Co-op Tyranny,
supra note 3, at 41, col. 2 (statement of Marc J. Luxemberg, president of Council
of New York Cooperatives, that "the bottom line [behind cooperative admissions
requirements] is that people want control over their own homes").
83. Jones, 189 Conn. at 654, 458 A.2d at 358.
84. See supra notes 42-59 and accompanying text.
85. Jones, 189 Conn. at 654, 458 A.2d at 358; see Mowatt, 385 F.2d at 137;
Bratt, supra note 49, at 785.
86. It has often been stated by the courts that the cooperative and tenant-
shareholder stand in a mere landlord-tenant relationship regarding residential controls
over the property. See California Coastal Comm'n v. Quanta Inv. Corp., 113 Cal
App. 3d 579, 597, 170 Cal. Rptr. 263, 272 (1981); Berman v. Watergate West,
Inc., 391 A.2d 1351 (D.C. 1978); 1901 Wyoming Ave. Coop. Ass'n v. Lee, 345
A.2d 456, 458 n.2 (D.C. 1975). This is based on the fact that the tenant-shareholder
does not "own" the apartment, but merely owns stock in the corporation, and
holds a long-term proprietary lease. See supra note 8. Since the tenant-shareholder
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realty-personalty distinction, 7 but on the only viable method of
dealing with a tenant-shareholder's interest-the recognition that the
primary purpose of the cooperative form of housing is to afford,
has delegated control over the property to the corporation, courts have viewed the
board of directors as the "landlord" of the building. POWELL, supra note 6, 1
633.16, at 829.
However, for the purpose of restricting a tenant-shareholder's ability to transfer
his unit, the landlord-tenant analogy is clearly inapplicable. Commentators correctly
contend that the tenant-shareholder should not be viewed as an ordinary lessee
since he possesses many rights not available to the tenant in a rental situation.
See, e.g., POWELL, supra, 633.16, at 829, Several of the courts which have
imposed a reasonableness standard on the board of directors recognize this fact,
since their jurisdictions continue to adhere to the common law view that a landlord
is free to arbitrarily withhold consent to an assignment or sublease of a residential
lease. Compare Strauss v. Summerhays, 157 Cal. App. 3d 806, 204 Cal. Rptr. 227
(1984); Jones v. O'Connell, 189 Conn. 648, 458 A.2d 355 (1983); Sunshine Villa
Apartments, Inc. v. Snyder, 335 So. 2d 841, 842 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976), appeal
dismissed, 345 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1977); Sanders v. Tropicana, 31 N.C. App. 276,
229 S.E.2d 304 (1976); Kohler v. Snow Village, Inc., 16 Ohio App. 3d 350, 475
N.E.2d 1298 (1984) with Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 488, 709 P.2d
837, 839 n.l, 220 Cal. Rptr. 818, 820 n.l (1985) (in holding that lessor may only
reasonably withhold consent to assignment or sublease, court expressly limited
holding to commercial leases); Robinson v. Weitz, 171 Conn. 545, 549, 370 A.2d
1066, 1068 (1976) (landlord may arbitrarily withhold consent to assignment or sub-
lease); Fernandez v. Vasquez, 397 So. 2d 1171, 1174 n.8 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)
(reasonable withholding of consent limited to commercial leases); Isbey v. Crews,
55 N.C. App. 47, 50, 284 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1981) (holding that landlord could
arbitrarily withhold consent; Sanders distinguished due to presence of corporate
stock in cooperative organization); F & L Center Co. v. Cunningham Drug Stores,
Inc., 19 Ohio App. 3d 72, 482 N.E.2d 1296 (1984) (landlord in commercial tenancy
may arbitrarily withhold consent).
The purpose of cooperative housing is to afford the closest approximation to
actual-home ownership in an urban setting. See infra note 88 and accompanying
text. The law already treats the tenant-shareholder as "owner" of his residence in
certain respects. See generally Bratt, supra note 49, at 761-90, There is no logical
reason for not extending this view of the tenant-shareholder as an "owner" when
evaluating restraints on the alienation of his interest. POWELL, supra, 633.16, at
829; see Bratt, supra, at 761 (author advocates the application of homestead ex-
emption to cooperative apartments; courts refusing to do so have utilized "technical
mechanical distinctions, rather than a broader, more purpose-oriented approach in
definition thereby ignoring the policy consideration at the very heart of homestead
exemption statutes-protection of a debtor's home"). The tenant-shareholder should
be treated more along the lines of a condominium unit owner for this analysis.
See infra note 87.
87. While the nature of a tenant-shareholder's interest has not received uniform
treatment, courts and scholars generally agree that it is not an interest in real
property. Bratt, supra note 49, at 780. This is in marked contrast to the condominium
unit owner's interest, which is recognized as real property. 1 P. ROHAN & M.
RESKIN, CONDOMINIUM LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.01 (1985). While the two property
rights differ in their classification, the ability of cooperative boards of directors
and condominium homeowner associations to restrain the transfer of membership
interests rests on identical aims: "first, to reduce the risk of financial interdependence
1986]
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in an urban setting, the closest thing to actual home ownership. 8
Denying the appropriate recognition to this ownership interest is
improper, and this is precisely why only reasonable restraints on
the alienation of cooperative apartments should be enforced.8 9
by excluding the economically unreliable; and second, to promote the project's
inner harmony by striving for compatible members." Berger, Condominium: Shelter
on a Statutory Foundation, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 983, 1018 (1963).
Despite these similar concerns, the New York condominium has much less dis-
cretion in restraining the transfer of a unit owner's interest. While it may not
discriminate on the same statutorily prohibited grounds applicable to cooperatives,
N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-v(2)(a) (McKinney 1968), it is otherwise forced to
exercise a pre-emptive right of first refusal to control membership in an owner's
association. An unconditional power to reject purchasers of units would be viewed
as an unreasonable restraint on an owner's right to alienate real property. Browder,
Restraints on the Alienation of Condominium Units (The Right of First Refusal),
1970 U. ILL. L.F. 231, 232.
It is unrealistic to treat the condominium unit owner and tenant-shareholder
differently in this respect. As one commentator has questioned: "[a]re the investment
and social positions of cooperative dwellers really inferior to those of condominium
owners in a similar project?" POWELL, supra note 6, 633.16, at 830; see also
Residential Controls, supra note 76, at 1336-37 (proprietary lessee's interest should
be equated with condominium unii owner in evaluating residential restrictions);
Realty or Personalty?, supra note 8, at 264 (rules of personalty or realty should
be applied to situations whenever either one furthers purpose of cooperative own-
ership to greater degree); Bratt, supra note 49, at 782 (same); POWELL, supra,
633.4[1], at 826.1 n.l (predicting that one day "courts may treat all forms of
residential communities alike in their restrictions on an owner's right to sell or
lease").
88. COOPERATIVE HOUSING LAW, supra note 6, at § 2.01[5] (quoting H. LESAR,
LANDLORD AND TENANT § .3.10, at 200 (1957)); Kohler, 16 Ohio App. 3d at 354,
475 N.E.2d at 1302; Bratt, supra note 49, at 775-76 (quoting Mixon, Apartment
Ownership in Texas: Cooperative and Condominium, I Hous. L. REV. 226, 227
(1964)); Realty or Personalty?, supra note 8, at 260.
89. Bratt, supra note 49, at 785; see cases cited supra note 72; see also Ro-
senberry, The Application of the Federal and State Constitutions to Condominiums,
Cooperatives and Planned Developments, 19 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 1,. 30-
31 (1984) (advising that appropriate test to apply to provisions restricting freedoms
of tenant-shareholder is that of reasonable restraint on alienation or common law
"rule of reasonableness") [hereinafter cited as Rosenberry]; Note, Federal Assistance
in Financing Middle-Income Cooperative Apartments, 68 YALE L.J. 542, 611 (1959)
(once FHA has passed on financial responsibility of prospective purchaser, "co-
operative should have to show that a rejected applicant has a definite history of
poorly maintaining property or failing to get along with his neighbors") [hereinafter
cited as Federal Assistance].
It may be said that since the tenant-shareholder purchased his interest in the
corporation with knowledge of these resale restrictions, he should be estopped from
enjoining their enforcement now. Alexy v. Kennedy House, Inc., 507 F. Supp. at
700; Rosenberry, supra, at 28. In return for the ability to protect his investment
and select his own neighbors, the tenant-shareholder has impliedly agreed to surrender
some of the rights he would ordinarily possess regarding control of his unit. However,
proponents of this argument ignore the fact that the courts protect the tenant-
shareholder from the enforcement of oppressive and arbitrary "house rules," even
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B. The Cooperative Interest
Some commentators undoubtedly would suggest that it is improper
to force a cooperative to accept an assignee of a tenant-shareholder,
even if its withholding of consent to the transfer is unreasonable."0
While no one will question the propriety of prohibiting a cooperative
from denying consent to a transfer on constitutionally suspect
grounds, 91 some may question the propriety of using various other
classifications. Constitutional scrutiny of various forms of private
discrimination is almost always unavailable to a rejected purchaser. 92
though the tenant-shareholder has vested power in the board of directors to manage
his home. See Garrison Apartments, Inc. v. Sabourin, 113 Misc. 2d 674, 449 N.Y.S.2d
629 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1982) (while cooperative rulemaking involves
subordination of ownership rights and privileges, standard of review is based upon
reasonableness of rule or regulation); Bratt, supra, at 778; see also Residential
Controls, supra note 76, at 1336 (fact that proprietary lessee has agreed to abide
by any and all house rules is only one factor to be weighed when assessing rule's
validity).
90. See Platovsky v. 17 East 96th Owners Corp., N.Y.L.J., May 21, 1986, at
11, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County) (tenant-shareholder applying for second apartment
lacks standing to sue co-op after rejected purchase); Weisner, 6 N.Y.2d at 434, 160
N.E.2d at 724, 190 N.Y.S.2d at 75-76 (stating that tenant-shareholder's obligation
to sell is typically made "subject" to approval of board of directors, and he therefore
has no duty to secure their consent); see also Strauss, 157 Cal. App. 3d at 815-16, 204
Cal. Rptr. at 233 (plaintiff did not have standing to enforce membership transfer
restrictions as third party beneficiary or tenant-shareholder's successor in interest).
91. These grounds include race, color, religion, sex and national origin. See
generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 585-818 (2d
ed. 1983).
92. Is it possible for an applicant to apply fourteenth amendment protections
to the cooperative admissions process? Any successful attempt to do so would
necessarily involve a judicial finding of "state action" by the cooperative's board
of directors. The unsuccessful plaintiff in Girard v. 94th St. & Fifth Ave. Corp.,
530 F.2d 66 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 974 (1976), alleging sex discrimination,
sought to have the board's decision denying her purchase analyzed as state action
under the Shelley doctrine (Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)). See generally
Rosenberry, supra note 74, at 1-31 (author discusses Girard and the various theories
of state action, recommending that federal and state constitutional safeguards not
be applied to government systems of common interest developments); cf. Calhoun,
The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments: Constitutional Authority for Federal
Legislation Against Private Discrimination, 61 MINN. L. REV. 313, 342-43 (1977)
(suggesting the Girard court failed to sufficiently distinguish facts so as to merit
a different outcome than that in Shelley) [hereinafter cited as Calhoun]; POWELL,
supra note 6, 633.15, at 826.9 n.10 (noting that when tenant-shareholder negotiates
sale, and corporation withholds consent on constitutionally impermissible grounds,
judicial action may implicate Shelley doctrine).
A rejected purchaser claiming to be the victim of arbitrary class discrimination
'could also allege a violation of the thirteenth amendment. The Fair Housing Act
of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1982), has been recognized as a valid exercise
of congressional power under the thirteenth amendment to reach private discrim-
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The desire of individuals to be free from arbitrary class discrim-
ination, however, must be weighed against one of the principal
advantages of cooperative housing: the "privilege of selecting neigh-
bors." 93 This advantage is not enjoyed by mere tenants who reside
in multi-unit dwellings similar to cooperative apartment buildings. 94
Indeed, as it was expressed by the court in Penthouse Properties,
"in a very real sense the tenant stockholders enter into a relation
not unlike a partnership, though expressed in corporate form." 95
Foisting the purchaser on the remaining tenant-shareholders when
the cooperative withholds consent for unreasonable, albeit non-sus-
pect classifications, would be a violation of this principle.96 This
remedy would be available under the proposed legislation,97 as rejected
purchasers could obtain injunctive relief after a denial of consent
ination. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). Under the
thirteenth amendment, "Congress has the power ... rationally to determine what
are the badges and the incidents of slavery, and the authority to translate that
determination into effective legislation." Id. at 446. To this date, Congress has
limited its enforcement power to the eradication of discrimination in housing based
on race, color, religion, sex or national origin. Fair Housing Act of 1968, § 804,
42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (1982).
In the absence of congressional action, could a rejected purchaser sue directly
under the thirteenth amendment, claiming that he has been the victim of such
egregious arbitrary class discrimination so as to constitute "a badge or incident of
slavery"? The answer turns on the fact that the thirteenth amendment is not seen
as a completely self-executing provision, and that the courts are reluctant to extend
its reach without an express exercise of Congress' power to define the badges and
incidents of slavery. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 226-27 (1971), overruled
on other grounds, Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252 (1977); see Buchanan, The Supreme Court and the Thirteenth Amend-
ment in the Modern Era, 12 Hous. L. REV. 844, 867-69 (1975); Calhoun, supra,
61 MINN. L. REv. at 360.
93. Penthouse Properties, 256 A.D. at 691, 11 N.Y.S.2d at 422.
One court has suggested that this privilege is not as important to the tenant-
shareholder when he resides in a cooperative residence other than an apartment
building. See Mowatt, 385 F.2d at 137. As opposed to the tenant-shareholders of
a 72 home subdivision (as presented in Gale v. York Center Community Coop.,
Inc., 21 Ill. 2d 86, 171 N.E.2d 30 (1961)) "[tlhe personal contacts [of tenant-
shareholders of a cooperative apartment building] are doubtless closer and more
frequent ... [therefore] an even closer control on the qualifications of new members
seems justified." Id.; cf. Co-operative Apartment Housing, supra note 52, at 1416
("having invested in the security of a home, [tenant-shareholders] are usually unwilling
and often unable to move away from an infiltration of unpopular neighbors").
94. See, e.g., Kohler, 16 Ohio App. 3d at 356-57, 475 N.E.2d at 1305.
95. 256 A.D. at 691, 11 N.Y.S.2d at 422.
96. See Weisner, 7 A.D.2d at 87, 180 N.Y.S.2d at 745-46 (Frank, J., dissenting).
97. A party who believes that he was the victim of unlawful discrimination
may maintain an action for damages or other appropriate relief, including injunctive
relief. See N.Y. Civ. RIGHTs LAW § 19-b (McKinney 1976) and N.Y. EXEC. LAW
§ 297(9) (McKinney 1982). However, by extending the coverage of the Executive
[Vol. XIV
1986] CO-OP TRANSFERS
based on their sexual preference, lawful source of income, occu-
pation, disability and other factors. 98
When a transfer of a tenant-shareholder's interest is prohibited
through the invocation of arbitrary classifications, the evil to be
remedied is the failure to recognize his legitimate right, as owner
of the property, "to enjoy reasonable access to a resale market." 99
However, if the cooperative does not discriminate on constitutionally
suspect grounds,'0 it is inconsistent with the social purpose of co-
operative ownership'0' to force the admission of a new tenant-
Law to cooperatives, see A. 6824, supra note 30, a rejected purchaser could get
an injunction mandating that the cooperative transfer title to an apartment to him
under circumstances which fail to adequately recognize the social purpose of co-
operative ownership. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
99. Jones v. O'Connell, 189 Conn. at 654, 458 A.2d at 358.
100. A bill before the New York State Legislature's current session, A. 571,
supra note 26, would prohibit a co-op from discriminating on the basis of sexual
preference. At this point in time, New York does not recognize a cause of action
for discrimination based on sexual preference. Konarski v. New York Med. College,
N.Y.L.J., Oct. 18, 1985, at 12, col. 2; Under 21 v. City of New York, 65 N.Y.2d
344, 482 N.E.2d 1, 492 N.Y.S.2d 522 (1985). Only Wisconsin and California
specifically protect homosexuals against housing discrimination. See Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 101.22 (West Supp. 1985-1986); Hubert v. Williams, 133 Cal. App. 3d
Supp. 1, 184 Cal. Rptr. 161 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1982) (homosexual tenants in
rental housing).
Section 8 of Assembly bill 571 provides that section 296 of the Executive Law
be amended to include affectional or sexual preference as a protected class. "The
term 'affectional or sexual preference' means having or manifesting an emotional
or physical attachment to another consenting person or persons of either gender
or having or manifesting a preference for such attachment."
While sexual preference has not yet been recognized as a "suspect classification"
under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, National Gay Task
Force v. Board of Educ., 729 F.2d 1270, 1273 (10th Cir. 1984), aff'd by an equally
divided Court, 105 S. Ct. 1858 (1985), commentators have argued that homosexuals
are deserving of such protection. See generally Note, The Constitutional Status of
Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification, 98 HARV. L. REV.
1285 (1985).
101. Any contention that the cooperative owes a contractual duty to the pro-
spective purchaser is clearly at odds with current authorities. See supra note 90.
However, some writers have commented on the recognition of housing access as
a constitutional right. Payne, The Condominium as a "Business Enterprise" Under
Civil Rights Legislation, 12 REAL EST. L.J. 266, 270-71 (1983) [hereinafter cited
as Payne 1]; Payne, Starting Over-Mount Laurel 11, 12 REAL EST. L.J. 85, 93-
94 (1983). Indeed, this argument seems superficially appealing in light of the current
housing shortage in New York, supra note 19, and high selectivity exercised by
many cooperative boards in screening residents. Lifton, supra note 21, at 67, col.
2. The argument may be made that due to the unavailability of comparable,
affordable rental housing in New York City, a cooperative's power to arbitrarily
deny a person access to housing impinges on this right. Such a conclusion may
be reached through the application of a "public accommodations" concept to the
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shareholder. Therefore, the "special nature" of cooperative
ownership '02 requires that a different remedy be fashioned to account
for the situation where a purchaser is denied admission based on
unreasonable grounds.103
IV. Defining the Reasonableness of a Cooperative's Rejection
The courts of other jurisdictions have focused on the tenant-
shareholder's right of alienation in imposing a standard of reason-
ableness on the cooperative's evaluation of prospective purchasers,
but have failed to clearly define what constitutes an acceptable reason
for rejecting an applicant.' °4 They merely state that the restraint on
the right of alienation must be exercised in light of the reasonable
economic and social needs of the cooperative.0 5 The realization of
these accepted goals of cooperative ownership must be balanced
against the interference with the tenant-shareholder's access to the
resale market. ,06
At present, federal, state and city statutes prohibit a cooperative
from discriminating on the basis of race, creed, national origin and
sex. 107 If a cooperative can offer reasons for a rejection other than
those grounds listed above, it may arbitrarily prohibit the transfer
of any apartment. Thus, a board is free to reject a purchaser because
he is a homosexual,' 8 a lawyer, 0 9 a famous entertainer,"10 a former
housing field, a strategy utilized by the Supreme Court of California in construing
that state's civil rights legislation. See infra notes 131-40 and accompanying text;
Payne 1, supra, at 270-71. But see Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972)
("[wle do not denigrate the importance of decent, safe, and sanitary housing. But,
the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every social and economic
ill. We are unable to perceive in that document any constitutional guarantee of
access to dwellings of a particular quality").
102. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
103. See infra notes 161-68 and accompanying text.
104. Cf. A Legal Hybrid, supra note 57, at 131, 133 (recognizing that the decision
of the Appellate Division', First Department in Weisner, subjecting cooperative
restrictions to reasonableness standard, failed to define "reasonable;" Weisner, 7
A.D.2d at 85, 180 N.Y.S.2d at 744 (Frank, J., dissenting) (suggesting business
judgment rule limits judicial review of board decisions regarding transfer of co-
operative interests).
105. See, e~g., Mowatt v. 1540 Lake Shore Drive Corp., 385 F.2d at 137.
106. Jones v. O'Connell, 189 Conn. at 654, 458 A.2d at 358; Bratt, supra note
49, at 785.
107. See supra note 3.
108. See supra note 100.
109. See Kramarsky v. Stahl Management Co., 92 Misc. 2d 1030, 1032, 401
N.Y.S.2d 943, 945 (1977).
110. See San Remo Co-op Board Rejects Madonna's Bid, N.Y. Times, July 19,
1985, at B3, col. 1; Margolies, supra note 3, at 20, col. I (noting suit brought
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President,' or for any number of other reasons." 2
Clearly, there are many valid reasons for rejecting prospective
purchasers. The financial condition or instability of a prospective
purchaser is of prime concern to the cooperative, due to the financial
interdependence of the tenant-shareholders." 3 The financial condition
of a prospective purchaser also provides objective criteria which can
be examined by the appropriate authorities to ensure that the co-
operative is not using the "financial inability" of the purchaser to
disguise discriminatory attitudes. '14
Beyond an applicant's objective fitness to meet his financial ob-
ligations as a shareholder, what other criteria can be said to protect
by tenant-shareholder in response to board rejection of potential sale to Sammy
Davis, Jr.).
Ill. See McFadden, Nixon May Move Back to City, N.Y. Times, Jan. 20,
1984, at B3, col. 5 [hereinafter cited as Nixon May Move]. Initially, the board of
directors of the cooperative had planned to approve the sale by telephone conference
call. However, a temporary restraining order was issued on application of a tenant-
shareholder, Jacob Kaplan, since telephone meetings were not permitted under the
corporation's by-laws. Id. After the board agreed to hold a face-to-face meeting,
the tenant-shareholder dropped his suit to bar Mr. Nixon's admittance into the
building. Nixon Co-op Bid to be Reviewed, N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1984, at A25,
col. 2 [hereinafter cited as Nixon Co-op Bid].
Although Mr. Nixon's purchase application was finally approved by vote of the
board and a special vote of the'*tenant-shareholders, Nixon Approved for Co-op,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1984, at B3, col. 1, Mr. Kaplan continued to voice his concern
that Mr. Nixon's presence would affect the peaceful environment of the building.
See infra note 119.
112. See cases cited supra note 73; see also Kaplan v. Wellington Coop. Bldg.
Corp., 567 F. Supp. 53 (N.D. 11. 1983) (refusal based solely on adverse reports
of prospective purchaser's investment failures, past conduct as co-tenant, and public
recognition as leading recipient of medicaid payments among doctors in Illinois);
Arakie v. 570 Park Ave. Apartments, Inc.., N.Y.L.J.,. Mar. 16, 1976, at 6, col.
I (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County) (rejection based on past experiences as tenant).
113. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text. That the financial interde-
pendence of the tenant-shareholders is of paramount importance when evaluating
an applicant is evident from the widespread failures of cooperatives during the
Depression. Bratt, supra note 49, at 772 (citing Mixon, Apartment Ownership in
Texas: Cooperative and Condominium, I Hous. L. REV. 226, 229 (1964)). Today,
with the rising prices of cooperative apartments in New York, boards are permitting
smaller percentages of the purchase price to be secured by borrowing. Co-ops
Tighten Standards, supra note 21, at 9, col. 2.
114. See Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032, 1043 (2d Cir. 1979)
(in context of cooperative admissions policies relying on subjective factors, "clever
men may easily conceal their motivations," quoting United States v. City of Black
Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1185 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975));
Rogers v. 66-36 Yellowstone Boulevard Coop. Owners, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 79, 86
(E.D.N.Y. 1984) (prohibiting cooperative from denying minority applicant oppor-
tunity to purchase apartment based on source of income unless it can point to "a
sound basis for believing that ... [the] income source will negatively affect his/
her ability to buy and maintain an apartment").
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the "reasonable social needs""' 5 of the cooperative? If an individual
might attract undue public attention to the building, ' 6 then the
withholding of consent is clearly justified. The same can be said
about individuals who are uncooperative in their interviews before
the board, '" who intend to sublet their apartment,' 8 or who threaten
the security of their fellow tenant-shareholders."19 However, as dis-
cussed below, the board has the power to unreasonably prohibit
transfers in situations where the tenant-shareholder's right of alien-
ation demands greater recognition.'2 0
115. In order to reject an applicant on purely subjective factors, after the FHA
has passed on his financial responsibility, one commentator has suggested that a
federally insured cooperative "should have to show that a rejected applicant has
a definite history of poorly maintaining property or failing to get along with his
neighbors." Federal Assistance, supra note 74, at 611.
116. See Lifton, supra note 21, at 67, col. 2 (public figures may be turned down
to protect integrity and security of building, or to avoid public nuisance).
117. See, e.g., Murphy v. 253 Garth Tenants Corp., 579 F. Supp. 1150, 1155
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (vagueness and unresponsiveness during screening interview deemed
to be acceptable reason for rejection under federal and state fair housing laws).
Such subjective reasons for rejection are common among New York City cooperative
boards. See Lifton, supra note 21, at 67, col. 2 (reasons for rejection in excluding
buyers often "sound like those heard in the admissions committee of an exclusive
country club, ranging from '1 heard that she was a pain in the neck in their last
building,' to 'They don't give enough to charity' or . . . 'They're really not our
kind of people' "). But cf. Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d at 1040
(where plaintiff alleges that cooperative rejected purchase on racially discriminatory
grounds, "court must carefully scrutinize suggested reasons that are not objective
in nature").
118. See supra note 13.
119. When former President Nixon attempted to purchase an apartment at 760
Park Avenue, a tenant-shareholder sought to block board approval because he
feared Mr. Nixon's presence might disturb the tranquility of the building. Nixon
May Move, supra note 111, at B3, col. 6. The tenant, Jacob Kaplan, expressed
concern that Mr. Nixon's arrival would turn the building into a "tourist attraction."
Nixon Co-op Bid, supra note 111, at A25, col. 1. In a letter to other tenant-
shareholders, he openly raised the possibility that "nutty people" might attempt
to harm Mr. Nixon, thereby exposing all of the building's residents to potential
life-threatening dangers. In addition, he questioned the desirability of having Secret
Service men on the premises. Nixon Approved for Co-op, supra note 11, at B3,
col. 1.
Despite Mr. Kaplan's objections, the building's six member board of directors
and twelve tenant-shareholders voted separately to approve the sale to Mr. Nixon.
Id. Mr. Nixon finally succeeded in purchasing an apartment after twice being denied
permission to buy Manhattan cooperative apartments by cooperative boards which
had expressed Mr. Kaplan's concerns. Nixon May Move, supra, at B3, col. 6.
Apparently, Mr. Kaplan's dislike of public figures as fellow tenants is shared by
other cooperative boards. See supra note 116. The slaying of John Lennon in front
of his residence in Manhattan will do nothing to calm these fears.
120. See infra notes 121-60 and accompanying text.
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A. Bad Faith by the Board: The Weisner Scenario
If no inquiry into the reasonableness of the board's decision to
reject an applicant is made, a tenant-shareholder's attempted sale
could be voided for purposes wholly unrelated to the applicant's
fitness as a shareholder. Situations are surfacing more frequently,
where a tenant-shareholder has been denied permission to sell his
apartment based on unreasonable factors. 2' Indeed, some tenant-
shareholders may be facing the same type of personal hostility as
was alleged in Weisner.'22
While the shareholder who was attempting to sell his apartment
was named as a co-defendant in Weisner, other individuals in the
same position have themselves sued the board'23 because they remained
121. See Lifton, supra note 21, at 67, col. 2; Co-ops Tighten Standards, supra
note 21, at 10, col. 3. See generally Co-op Tyranny, supra note 3, reporting the
following situations where a board did not approve the tenant-shareholder's pur-
chaser:
1. Individual who had built up personal fortune of $25 million was
rejected on the ground that board members would have preferred "a
person with inherited money." Co-op Tyranny, supra note 3, at 38, col. 2.
2. Couple who sought to purchase an $850,000 Manhattan apartment,
and offered to pay the entire purchase price in cash, were rejected by
the board and given no reason for this decision. When the couple filed
a complaint with the New York City Human Rights Commission, the
board defended its decision on the ground that the couple hadn't exhibited
sufficient cultural interests, and the husband was too absorbed in his
work and was seen as an "entrepreneurial" type. The commission has
not yet reached a decision in this case. Id. at 38, col. 3.
3. A board initially rejected a buyer with a liquid net worth of over
$1 million, who sought to purchase a $270,000 apartment almost entirely
in cash. A board member notified the selling tenant-shareholder that the
buyer was "too wealthy and would not be interested in the building-
that someone with less money would be more dedicated to the building."
After a meeting with the disenchanted tenant-shareholder, the board
reconsidered its decision. Id. at 44, col. 2.
122. See id. at 45, col. 1. A mother and son brought suit alleging that the board's
refusal to approve three financially acceptable purchasers was due to the fact that
the son had opposed the board's plan to implement a security program. More than
one year later, the cooperative settled the suit by purchasing the apartment from
the tenant-shareholders. Id.
123. This occurred in Jones, Gale, Logan, Mowatt, Sanders, and Kohler. Indeed,
it is doubtful whether a rejected purchaser has standing to sue either the cooperative
corporation or the selling tenant-shareholder, in the absence of statutorily prohibited
discrimination. See supra note 90.
What should be the result when a tenant-shareholder sues the cooperative cor-
poration, not as a seller of an apartment, but as a prospective purchaser? This
situation results when a tenant-shareholder seeks to purchase an additional unit in
his cooperative apartment building. See Jones, 189 Conn. 648, 458 A.2d 355;
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liable for the monthly carrying charges until a new purchaser was
approved.24 While a cause of action against the board might lie for
breach of a fiduciary obligation to treat all shareholders equally,'25
Goldstone v. Constable, 84 A.D.2d 519, 443 N.Y.S.2d 380; Lester v. Knolls Coop.
Section No. 1, Inc., N.Y.L.J., Aug. 19, 1981, at 11, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County);
Gorman v. Presidential Towers Residence, Inc., N.Y.L.J., Oct. 4, 1978, at 6, col.
3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County). The better view seems to be that in the absence of
any contractual right granted to a tenant-shareholder, "[tihere is no basis . . .for
any favored treatment for [a prospective purchaser] because he is presently a tenant-
shareholder of an apartment in the building." Gorman, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 4, 1978,
at 6, col. 3.
124. In Sanders, 31 N.C. App. 276, 229 S.E.2d 304, the plaintiff tenant-share-
holder got married, had a child, and due to the need for greater space purchased
a new home. He vacated his apartment late in 1972 and offered it for sale, while
continuing to pay the co-op monthly charges. Id. at 278, 229 S.E.2d at 306.
In March 1973, plaintiff received an offer for the apartment. The board of
directors refused to consent to the sale, since the prospective purchaser intended
to sublet rather than occupy the apartment immediately. Plaintiff subsequently sold
his apartment in July 1974, but had terminated monthly payments in the co-op
after March 1973. The co-op sought to recover the delinquent payments at trial.
Id.
The plaintiff in Sanders was fortunate in that he was able to leave his apartment
before the sale was approved. But where the purchase of a new residence is dependent
upon the sale of a cooperative apartment a rejection of the buyer can create great
difficulty for the seller. See Lifton, supra note 21, at 67, col. 2; see also Weisner
v. 791 Park Ave. Corp., 12 Misc. 2d 774, 775, 177 N.Y.S.2d 887, 888 (1958)
(analogizing hardships suffered by tenant-shareholder who fails to obtain board
approval to those suffered by commercial tenant who is denied consent to assignment,
while no longer having any use for the property); Co-operative Apartment Housing,
supra note 52, at 1418 (recognizing the possible "spectacle of a tenant-owner being
forced into insolvency while approval of a sale of his interest was withheld because
the other tenants disliked the prospective purchaser").
125. See, e.g., Goldstone v. Constable, 84 A.D.2d at 520, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 381;
Jones v. O'Connell, 189 Conn. at 659, 458 A.2d at 360; see also Schwartz v.
Marien, 37 N.Y.2d 487, 491, 335 N.E.2d 334, 337, 373 N.Y.S.2d 122, 126 (1975)
("members of a corporate board of directors . . . owe a fiduciary responsibility
to the shareholders in general and to individual shareholders in particular to treat
all shareholders fairly and evenly").
A recent decision by the New York Court of Appeals, striking down a "flip
tax" imposed by a cooperative board of directors, may have far greater implications
regarding the statutory duty to treat all cooperative shareholders equally..
In Fe Bland v. Two Trees Management Co., 66 N.Y.2d 556, 489 N.E.2d 223, 498
N.Y.S.2d 336 (1985), the court struck down a board imposed flip tax as being
violative of New York Business Corporation Law section 501(c). N.Y. Bus. CORP.
LAW § 501(c) (McKinney 1963). The fee varied in amount depending upon whether
the seller purchased his shares from the sponsor or from a tenant-shareholder on
the resale of his apartment. A different fee rate was also applied to individuals
who had been owners for five years or more. 66 N.Y.2d at 560-61, 489 N.E.2d
at 225, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 338.
Section 501(c) states that "each share shall be equal to every other share of the
class." The Fe Bland court interpreted the statute'to require that "shares of the
same class be equal in all respects to every other share of the class." Id. at 569,
489 N.E.2d at 230, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 343. Thus, the transfer fee in question clearly
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or for a tortious interference with the contract,2 6 the plaintiff's
burden of proof will be more difficult to meet because the boaid
has no obligation to document its reasons for rejection.'27
B. The Elimination of Arbitrary Classifications: The California
Approach
It has been stated by some New York City real estate brokers
that the major obstacle in gaining admission to'a cooperative is not
the prospective purchaser's appearance during his interview, but
having the interview granted. 2 ' Cooperatives have been said to frown
upon certain classes of individuals when evaluating purchase appli-
cations. 2 9 Their reluctance to accept these individuals as tenant-
shareholders has nothing to do with any individual characteristics
the applicant might possess; rather, the cooperative is concerned
at 569, 489 N.E.2d at 230. Thus, the transfer fee in question clearly violated this
violated this provision.
Many of the cases challenging board decisions to reject prospective purchasers
have been brought by the selling tenant-shareholder. See supra note 123. What
would happen if a tenant-shareholder, angered by the board's decision, sought to
invalidate the requirement of board approval as being violative of section 501(c)?
The by-laws and proprietary lease typically provide that a tenant-shareholder may
not assign or sublease his unit without the prior consent of the board of directors,
which may be withheld for any or no reason. See supra note 12. However, a
typical proprietary lease includes a clause reserving the sponsor's right to assign
or sublease, without board approval, the units corresponding to any unsold shares
that he may hold after the closing date. See 2B COOPERATIVE HOUSING LAW, supra
note 6, App. D-17, at App-492.1038(40). Any argument that these are in fact
two separate classes of stock, and therefore not in violation of section 501(c),
would be fatal to the corporation. Section 216(b)(l)(A) of the Internal Revenue
Code requires that a cooperative have only one class of stock to receive favorable
tax treatment. I.R.C. § 216(b)(l)(A) (1982). Therefore, the different rights afforded
to shares of the same class of stock regarding resale could be a violation of B.C.L.
section 501(c). Sadowsky, Court Clarifies the Law Regarding Co-op Flip Tax,
N.Y.L.J., Mar. 12, 1986, at 23, cols. 3-4. But see Margolies & Weisberg, Flip
Tax Decisions Raise Complex Issues for Co-ops, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 12, 1986, at 32,
cols. 1-2 (suggesting that the Fe Bland court's failure to address exemption of unsold
shares from flip tax, as presented by facts of the case, is judicial recognition of
their special status). The co-op prevailed in the first case addressing this issue. See
Platovsky v. 17 East 96th Owners Corp., N.Y.L.J., May 21, 1986, at 11, col. 3
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County).
126. See Jones v. O'Connell, 189 Conn. at 660, 458 A.2d at 361; Weisner v.
791 Park Ave. Corp., 7 A.D.2d 75, 86, 180 N.Y.S.2d 734, 744 (1st Dep't 1958)
(Frank, J., dissenting).
127. See infra note 184 and accompanying text.
128. See Co-ops Tighten Standards, supra note 21, at 9, col. 5 (describing co-
op refusals to show apartments to certain individuals as "a matter of' day-to-day
business").
129. See id. (identifying opera singers, foreign diplomats, bachelors, single women,
unmarried couples, couples of the same sex, individuals in the real estate and
garment industries, "shrinks" and criminal attorneys as examples).
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with the individual's status as a member of a certain "class."' 30
The Supreme Court of California, in two recent decisions,' 3' has
addressed a similar problem, pointing to the undesirable results which
follow from the exercise of arbitrary class distinctions in the housing
context.
In O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Association'32 and Marina Point,
Ltd. v. Wolfson,'3 3 the court was concerned with the application of
the Unruh Act,14 California's civil rights legislation, which prohibits
discriminatory actions barring access to public accommodations. Mar-
ina Point involved a challenge to a landlord's policy restricting
occupancy in his building to adults only, on the grounds that children
are "rowdier, noisier, more mischievous and more boisterous than
adults."' The court noted that the protections against discrimination
afforded by the Unruh Act apply to "all persons," and are not
reserved for restricted categories of prohibited discrimination enum-
erated in the statute.'36 Thus, the statute did not permit a "business
enterprise" to exclude an entire class of individuals from access to
its services on the basis of a generalized prediction that the class,
"as a whole," is more likely to commit misconduct than some other
classes of the public."'" The landlord's policy of restricting occu-
pancy to adults was struck down as violative of the statute.'38 In
O'Connor, the court used the same reasoning to strike down a
condominium association's age-based occupancy restriction.'
The policies underlying the Unruh Act's condemnation of arbitrary
130. Id.
131. O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 33 Cal. 3d 790, 662 P.2d 427,
191 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1983); Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 640
P.2d 115, 180 Cal. Rptr. 496, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 858 (1982).
132. 33 Cal. 3d 790, 662 P.2d 427, 191 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1983).
133. 30 Cal. 3d 721, 640 P.2d 115, 180 Cal. Rptr. 496 (1982).
134. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 1982 & Supp. 1985) provides that "[aill persons
within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their
sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin are entitled to the full and
equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business
establishments of every kind whatsoever."
135. 30 Cal. 3d at 725, 640 P.2d at 117, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 498.
136. This interpretation of the statute was first enunciated in In re Cox, 3 Cal.
3d 205, 474 P.2d 992, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1970). At the time of this decision, the
Unruh Act prohibited discrimination on the basis of "race, color, religion, ancestry
or national origin." However, the Cox court concluded that the "identification of
particular bases of discrimination ... is illustrative rather than restrictive" and
that the Unruh Act prohibited all arbitrary discrimination by business establishments.
3 Cal. 3d at 216, 474 P.2d at 999, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 31.
137. 30 Cal. 3d at 739, 640 P.2d at 125, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 507.
138. Id. at 745, 640 P.2d at 129, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 511.
139. 33 Cal. 3d at 796-97, 662 P.2d at 431, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 324..
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classifications as a means of barring access to rental housing and
condominium associations can be applied, by analogy, to cooper-
atives. Implicit in the California Supreme Court's interpretation of
the statute is the right of individuals to be judged on the basis of
their personal characteristics, and not by their membership in a
certain class. Unlike the Marina Point and O'Connor decisions,
which are based on a "public accommodations" theory, °40 the exercise
of arbitrary class discrimination by cooperative boards should be
struck down as an unreasonable restraint on a tenant-shareholder's
right of alienation. Very often, a prospective purchaser's rejection
is based on factors that have no apparent bearing on his ability to
be a congenial, peaceful member of the cooperative community. 4'
One area where this analysis should be applied is a cooperative's
use of occupation 42 as an arbitrary criterion to deny admittance to
a prospective purchaser. There are certain individuals whose occu-
pation itself involves considerations which could affect the peaceful
environment of the building. 43 However, may the same reasoning
be applied to a real estate broker, or a garment center worker, who
is objectively able to meet his obligations as a shareholder yet is
turned down because of his occupation? Occupation does not take
on the status of a constitutionally protected class, as do the other
enumerated classes in the fair housing laws.' The practice of certain
140. 30 Cal. 3d at 730-33, 640 P.2d at 120-22, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 502-03.
141. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text. When a rejected purchaser
alleges statutorily prohibited discrimination, a court will scrutinize a cooperative's
stated reasons for rejection. See Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d at
1041; see also Bishop v. Pecsok, 431 F. Supp. 34, 37 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (landlord's
policy of considering applicants' family background, scholastic achievement and
status as either graduate or undergraduate student is not a "demonstrably ...
reasonable measure of the applicants' ability to be a 'successful tenant' ").
142. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. The Marina Point court itself
referred to the absurd results which can follow from allowing discriminatory clas-
sifications based on occupation:
Under such an approach, for example, members of entire occupations
... might find themselves excluded as a class from some places of public
accommodation simply because the proprietors could show that, as a
statistical matter, members of their occupation ... were more likely than
others to be involved in a disturbance .... Entrepreneurs cannot pursue
a broad status-based exclusionary policy that operates to deprive innocent
individuals of the services of the business enterprise.
30 Cal. 3d at 739, 640 P.2d at 126-27, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 507-08.
143. See supra note 119.
144. At present, cooperatives may not discriminate on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex and national origin. These are all suspect classifications under an equal
protection analysis. See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, CoNsTITU-
TIONAL LAW 585-818 (2d ed. 1983).
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occupations may, in some instances, put the board on edge in that
the members may suspect the applicant will practice his profession
in his residence.'4 5 However, there are remedies available to the
cooperative if the applicant does engage in undesirable behavior.
46
The cooperative need not resort to these measures if it requires, as
a condition to its approval of the sale, that the applicant not engage
in certain specified acts which it deems harmful to the peaceful
environment of the building. 47
Since the use of such arbitrary classifications does not evaluate
an applicant on the basis of his personal characteristics, it represents
an unreasonable restraint on the tenant-shareholder's right of alien-
ation. However, if it is not a classification repugnant to the Con-
stitution, such as occupation, it is contrary to the "social purpose"
of cooperative housing to force the admission of the prospective
purchaser.
C. An Unreasonable Board: Murphy v. 253 Garth Tenants
Corp.
In an action to challenge a rejected purchase, a rejected purchaser
typically seeks injunctive relief mandating that the board transfer
145. See, e.g., Ebner v. 91st St. Tenants Corp., 126 Misc. 2d 108, 481 N.Y.S.2d
198 (1984) (board denied consent to transfer on ground that purchaser, a psychiatrist,
intended to use apartment primarily for treating patients and only secondarily as
a residence; rejection reversed by vote of tenant-shareholders where proprietary
lease provided for such action).
146. A typical proprietary lease will provide that the lease may be terminated
by a specified vote of the tenant-shareholders or the board finding another tenant-
shareholder's conduct to be "undesirable." Margolies, supra note 3, at 19, cols.
1-3; see 2A COOPERATIVE HOUSING LAW, supra note 6, App. D-3, at App-292 and
App. D-4, at App-364.198-. 199'(illustrative examples in actual cooperative corporation
documents); see also Brisbane House, Inc. v. Sims, 122 Misc. 2d 46, 469 N.Y.S.2d
561 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1983) (co-op may bring holdover proceeding
under Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law § 711(1) when it finds tenant-
shareholder's conduct to be "undesirable;" while court must make de novo finding
of undesirable conduct sufficient to support eviction, it must take notice of special
nature of cooperative occupancy in reaching this determination); Adams Hotel
Owners, Inc. v. Wolf, 64 Misc. 2d 614, 316 N.Y.S.2d 696 (App. Term. 1st Dep't
1969) (same); Jimerson Hous. Co. v. Butler, 102 Misc. 2d 423, 425 N.Y.S.2d 924
(App. Term. 2d Dep't 1979) (landlord-tenant relationship exists between co-op and
its tenant-shareholders to the extent that co-op may maintain non-payment summary
proceeding). But see Plaza Road Coop., Inc. v. Finn, 201 N.J. Super. 174, 492
A.2d 1072 (App. Div. 1985) (relationship between cooperative and tenant-shareholder
is not one of landlord-tenant, and therefore court had no jurisdiction to hear
cooperative summary dispossess action brought under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A: 18-
61.1 (West Supp. 1985)).
147. See Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032, 1041 (2d Cir. 1979).
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the shares and corresponding proprietary lease.' 4 However, even in
jurisdictions which hold the board to a reasonableness standard in
evaluating purchase applications, plaintiffs have seldom been suc-
cessful in receiving this drastic remedy. 4 9 In most cases the board
has been able to offer valid, non-discriminatory reasons for the
denial of consent to a proposed transfer. 50
Murphy v. 253 Garth Tenants Corp.'5' is the only reported
case where the plaintiff has been awarded possession of a New York
cooperative apartment after the board denied a purchase appli-
cation on grounds not prohibited by statute. Murphy, a federal
district court decision, is an example of the unreasonable withholding
of consent to a transfer by a cooperative's board of directors. In
Murphy, a mother and daughter brought suit against the cooperative
and its president, alleging that the defendants had unlawfully'
rejected each of their purchase applications on the basis of sex,
national origin and possibly their marital status.'
During the trial, three members of the board described the criteria
used to evaluate purchase applications: "whether or not the applicant
148. See, e.g, Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1979).
149. See Murphy v. 253 Garth Tenants Corp., 579 F. Supp. 1150 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) (unreasonable withholding of consent under cooperative by-law provision);
see also Robinson, 610 F.2d 1032 (racial discrimination under federal Fair Housing
Act; denial of injunctive relief reversed and case remanded to district court to hear
testimony regarding intent of board member in withholding consent to purchase);
Logan, 385 F.2d at 137 (proof that proposed subtenant was rejected without
evaluation of his personal characteristics sufficient to establish prima facie case of
arbitrary and capricious action by cooperative board of directors; case remanded
to trial court for further consideration).
150. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
151. 579 F. Supp. 1150 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
152. The plaintiffs asserted their federal claims under the Fair Housing Act of
1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (1982), and a pendent state claim under the N.Y.
Executive law. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(5)(a) (McKinney 1982).
153. It is unclear as to whether the plaintiffs alleged that the co-op denied them
the right to acquire the apartment on the basis of their marital status. In the initial
portion of his opinion, the trial judge identified the question of fact to be resolved
in the action: whether the co-op had denied the purchase application based on the
sex or national origin of the plaintiffs. 579 F. Supp. at 1151-52.
However, the opinion later goes on to state that the co-op's purchase application
requested information concerning the plaintiffs' marital status, id. at 1153, and
that the court found the board members' testimony that their rejection of the
plaintiffs Vas unrelated to their national origin or marital status to be credible.
Id. at 1154. The court made a point to recognize that later application forms filled
out by the plaintiffs omitted the marital status and national origin questions. Id.
at 1154, 1155.
Therefore, it is uncertain whether the court found the prohibition against marital
status discrimination in Executive Law § 296(5)(a) to apply to co-ops. This is an
open question in New York. See supra note 3.
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intends to live in the apartment, the applicant's financial capacity
and whether the applicant would be a good neighbor, congenial and
peaceful, fitting in with the image of the Cooperative."'15 4 The reason
the board members gave for the denial of permission to transfer
the apartment to either Catherine or Patricia Murphy was Catherine's
unresponsiveness and vagueness during her interview.' 55 At that time
she was uncertain as to what she intended to do with her existing
apartment, did not know the persons who had been listed as ref-
erences, and was uncertain with respect to questions concerning
finances, bank accounts and available funds. 56
After weighing the above testimony, the court found this evidence
to be credible, and dismissed Ms. Murphy's claims brought under
state and federal fair housing laws. However, these were not the
only claims brought in this action.
The tenant-shareholders who had contracted to sell their apartment
to the Murphys, Michael and Susan Ugliarolo, had joined in the
action as plaintiffs. They alleged that the board had unreasonably
withheld its consent to the attempted sale, which was prohibited by
a provision in the cooperative's by-laws. 5 7 Thus, the cooperative
had bound itself to the Ugliarolos on a much higher standard than
154. 579 F. Supp. at 1154.
155. Id. at 1155. Catherine and Patricia Murphy, mother and daughter, had
separately applied to purchase the same apartment. After her mother's application
was twice denied, Patricia sought board approval to purchase the apartment herself.
She offered to provide in writing that her mother would not live in the apartment.
However, the board members testified that they believed Catherine would use the
apartment, and that in their view, Patricia's application stood or fell with her
mother's.
They therefore rejected both applications based upon "a subjective evaluation
of the unknown kind of tenancy which would result as a consequence of Catherine's
vague and unresponsive answers." Id. at 1155.
156. Id. at 1153.
157. The relevant provision provided that "[tlhe shares may be transferred only
after consent of the Board of Directors, which consent shall not be unreasonably
withheld." Id.
The court found the by-laws controlling over a contrary provision contained in
the proprietary lease, which provided that the board could withhold consent to an
assignment for any or no reason. Id. at 1155-56. Since the capital investment in
the shares entitles the tenant-shareholder to the proprietary lease, and the by-laws
govern the rights and restraints associated with the shares, the court found the
by-law provision to control. Id. at 1156; see also Siegler, Limitations on Transfer
Fees, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 2, 1985, at 2, col. 4 (analyzing this portion of the Murphy
decision as it relates to the validity of a "flip tax" imposed by a co-op's board
of directors on the sale of shares); Jones v. O'Connell, 189 Conn. at 655, 458
A.2d at 359 (memorandum of offering which limited the authority to disapprove
assignments to individuals of unsuitable "character and financial responsibility"
controlled over unqualified consent clause in proprietary lease).
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was presented by the facts in Weisner. It had subjected itself to the
type of inquiry required by jurisdictions which give greater recog-
nition to the tenant-shareholder's right of alienation.
The court then referred to the history of New York decisions
interpreting the reasonable withholding of consent. 5 ' Such cases have
typically required an evaluation based on the objective suitability of
the proposed transferee. 5 9 Since the reasons the board members
supplied (vagueness and unresponsiveness of the applicant) failed to
rise to the standard of objectivity required by these cases, the court
granted the injunction and forced Catherine's admission into the
cooperative. ,60
There are several lessons to be learned from the decision in
Murphy. Of primary importance is the court's holding that a co-
operative's stated reasons for rejecting an applicant were permissible
under fair housing laws, but were unreasonable in light of the higher
duty owed to the tenant-shareholder's right of alienation. In addition,
the fact that the applicant was not discriminated against on statutorily
prohibited grounds, yet succeeded in gaining admission to the co-
operative, is a violation of the cooperative's privilege to select its
own members.
V. Recommendation
A. The Unreasonable Withholding Of Consent
A middle ground must be found to accommodate two competing
interests: the tenant-shareholder's right of alienation, and the co-
operative's privilege of selecting its members. A satisfactory answer
can be found by reference to New York Real Property Law, section
226-b,' 6' which deals with the remedies available to a tenant when
158. 579 F. Supp. at 1156 (citing Kruger v. Page Management Co., 105 Misc.
2d 14, 432 N.Y.S.2d 295 (1980)).
159. Such factors include:
(a) financial responsibility;
(b) the identity or business character of the subtenants, including suitability for
the particular building;
(c) legality of the proposed use; and
(d) nature of the occupancy.
Kruger, 105 Misc. 2d at 23, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 302 (quoting American Book Co. v.
Yeshiva Univ. Dev. Found., 59 Misc. 2d 31, 33, 297 N.Y.S.2d 156, 160 (1969)).
While American Book Co. dealt with commercial tenants, the Kruger court's
identification of relevant factors pertaining to residential tenants is substantially
similar. 105 Misc. 2d at 34, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 308.
160. Murphy, 579 F. Supp. at 1156.
161. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 226-b (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985).
19861
FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL
a landlord unreasonably withholds his consent to an attempted as-
signment or sublease.1 61 If the landlord unreasonably withholds his
consent to an assignment, the tenant's sole remedy is a release, and
he will not be bound to pay rent for the remainder of the lease
term. By the same token, the landlord remains free to select a tenant
by exercising his unfettered discretion. 63
162.
1. Unless a greater right to assign is conferred by the lease, a tenant
renting a residence may not assign his lease without the written consent
of the owner, which consent may be unconditionally withheld without
cause provided that the owner shall release the tenant from the lease
upon request of the tenant upon thirty days notice if the owner unrea-
sonably withholds consent which release shall be the sole remedy of the
tenant. If the owner reasonably withholds consent, there shall be no
assignment and the tenant shall not be released from the lease.
2. (a) A tenant renting a residence pursuant to an existing lease in a
dwelling having four or more residential units shall have the right to
sublease his premises subject to the written consent of the landlord in
advance of the subletting. Such consent shall not be unreasonably with-
held.
Id.
163. The history of § 226-b's enactment and subsequent amendments is illustrative
of the similar interests which exist between co-ops and landlords in the selection
of residents on their property.
The housing shortage in New York City has been a cause for concern since the
end of World War 11. The vacancy rate among rental apartments has been far
below what is deemed to be acceptable in an urban environment. Housing Crisis,
supra note 17, at B5, col. 1. As a result of this situation, an unequal bargaining
position developed between landlord and tenant, so that a landlord was free to
insist that a clause absolutely prohibiting an assignment or sublease without his
consent be included in the lease. Kruger v. Page Management Co., 105 Misc. 2d
14, 25-26, 432 N.Y.S.2d 295, 303-04 (1980), appeal dismissed, 80 A.D.2d 525 (1st
Dep't 1981). Under the common law, this consent could be withheld for any or
no reason. Arlu Assocs. v. Rosner, 14 A.D.2d 272, 220 N.Y.S.2d 288 (1st Dep't
1961), aff'd, 12 N.Y.2d 693, 185 N.E.2d 913, 233 N.Y.S.2d 477 (1962).
However, through statutory intervention, the landlord's power to arbitrarily
prohibit an assignment or sublease was brought under control. This action was
"based upon the equitable belief an enlightened society must to some extent protect
its members from the harsh effect of an unchecked society." Kruger, 105 Misc.
2d at 20, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 300.
Real Property Law section 226-b, as originally enacted, provided that a landlord
could not unreasonably withhold consent to a tenant's proposed sublease. 1975
N.Y. Laws ch. 58. Subsequently, similar provisions were added relating to the right
to assign residential leases: 1975 N.Y. Laws chs. 148 and 548, and 1976 N.Y. Laws
ch. 548. The amended statute came under attack in a series of cases where it was
argued that the Legislature never intended to force a landlord to accept an assignee
against his wishes, as this would unreasonably infringe upon his right to rent his
property to individuals of his own choice. See Bragar v. Berkeley Assocs.,
111 Misc. 2d 333, 444 N.Y.S.2d 355 (1981); Equity Props. Corp. v. Bonhomme,
109 Misc. 2d 760, 440 N.Y.S.2d 993 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1981); Meredith v.
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An analogy may be made between the positions of the tenant and
the tenant-shareholder. Typically, a tenant-shareholder pays "rent"
in the form of maintenance charges, and his pro-rata share of the
building's mortgage and taxes.' 64 If a prospective purchaser is rejected
by the cooperative the tenant-shareholder remains liable for these
charges until a purchaser has been approved. 6 This is true even if
he has already moved to another residence. Unlike a tenant, who
might abandon his apartment rather than maintain the costs of two
residences,' 66 a tenant-shareholder cannot get up and walk away in
as much as his equity is still tied up in the apartment.' 67
If a cooperative unreasonably withholds its consent to a transfer,
the tenant-shareholder's right of alienation must receive some rec-
985 Fifth Ave., N.Y.L.J., July 31, 1981, at 4, col. 5; Grayshaw v. New Amsterdam
Apartments Co., 106 Misc. 2d 936, 436 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1981). While only one of
these decisions adopted the landlords' interpretation of the statute (Grayshaw, 106
Misc. 2d at 940, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 806) other courts were sympathetic to their
position. See, e.g., Bragar v. Berkeley Assocs., Ill Misc. 2d at 339, 444 N.Y.S.2d
at 359 (recognizing that it may be necessary "to draw a distinction between subletting
and assigning as the right to the latter is not really germane to the evils sought to
be redressed by section 226-b of the Real Property Law, but that is a matter for
the Legislature and not this court").
In response to this situation, the Legislature subsequently amended section 226-
b to provide that release from the lease is the tenant's sole remedy when a landlord
unreasonably withholds his consent to an assignment. 1983 N.Y. Laws ch. 403, §
37. While a landlord may now arbitrarily prohibit any assignment, a tenant will
no longer be bound to pay rent for the remaining term of the lease. Thus, the
landlord maintains his freedom to select tenants of his choice absent statutorily
prohibited discrimination.
164. See supra note 53.
165. See supra note 124.
166. The ordinary tenant may have an advantage over the tenant-shareholder in
that a landlord is under a duty to mitigate damages upon the tenant's abandonment.
Compare Forty Exch. Co. v. Cohen, 125 Misc. 2d 475, 479 N.Y.S.2d 628 (N.Y.C.
Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1984) and Paragon Indus. v. Williams, 122 Misc. 2d 628,
473 N.Y.S.2d 92 (App. Term. 2d Dep't 1983) (holding mitigation requirement applicable
to commercial and residential leasep, respectively) with Spohn v. Fine, 124 Misc.
2d 1075, 479 N.Y.S.2d 139 (Yates County Ct. 1984) (refusing to extend duty to
mitigate to lease agreements in absence of definitive statement by New York Court
of Appeals).
While the Spohn court correctly pointed out that the New York Court of Appeals
has yet to overturn the result reached in Becar v. Flues, 64 N.Y. 518 (1889), other
states have imposed the duty of mitigation upon landlords. See Forty Exch. Co.,
125 Misc. 2d at 487 n.3, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 636 n.3.
167. It is possible for a tenant-shareholder to be relieved from future liability
for monthly charges by inserting an escape clause in the proprietary lease. Co-
OPERATIVE HOUSING LAW, supra note 6, § 11.04, at 11-10 n.4. However, this
alternative loses its attractiveness when one realizes that the tenant-shareholder must
forfeit his interest in the cooperative when exercising this right. 2A id. App. D-3
at App-292 to -293.
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ognition. If the tenant-shareholder produces a financially capable
purchaser, and the board arbitrarily denies the application, the burden
should then be shifted to the cooperative to provide a purchaser,
at an agreed upon purchase price, within a given statutory period,
such as sixty days. The tenant-shareholder should be released from
liability for the monthly carrying charges if the board has not
produced another purchaser by the end of a thirty day period. At
this time, the shares would be placed in trust, where they could not
be voted by either party.
In this way, both interests are addressed: the "owner" of the
apartment is released from liability for future payments, and the
cooperative is not forced to take someone into the "partnership"
against its will. Once the initial thirty day period expires, the co-
operative has an additional thirty days to either provide another
purchaser willing to match the rejected purchaser's offer, or purchase
the apartment from the tenant-shareholder directly." 8 If it fails to
do either, the cooperative is deemed to have consented to the tenant-
shareholder's initial sale.
B. A Reason for Rejection
The legislature currently has before it a bill which would require
cooperative housing corporations to give a rejected applicant a reason
for failing to approve his purchase.' 69 This bill, which has been
introduced in past sessions, has recently been rejected by the senate.'70
There are several strong policy reasons to justify its passage.
168. A similar device was utilized by a condominium association in Lyons v.
King, 397 So. 2d 964 (Fla. App. 1981).
169. A. 854, 209th Sess. (1986), STATE OF NEW YORK LEGISLATIVE DIGEST A74
(1986).
Section three of the bill proposes that section 296(5) of the Executive Law be
amended to read as follows:
(a) It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for the owner, lessee,
sub-lessee, assignee, or managing agent of, or other person having the
right to sell, rent or lease a housing accommodation, constructed or to
be constructed ... or any party having the power to approve sales,
rentals or leasing ...(4) To fail to provide, upon request, a written statement to any person,
who was denied the right to make an offer or whose offer to purchase,
rent or lease any accommodation covered by this subdivision was rejected,
setting forth the reasons for such denial or rejection. Any such request
shall be made in writing within thirty days of the denial or rejection
and the written statement shall be provided within thirty days of the
receipt of the request.
Id. (emphasis added to identify new provisions).
170. Id.
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1. The Rogers Decision: True Confessions
A requirement that a cooperative housing corporation give a reason
for rejecting minority applicants was reached for the first time in
Rogers v. 66-36 Yellowstone Boulevard Cooperative Owners, Inc."'
Rogers, a black schoolteacher, sued the defendant cooperative cor-
poration under several fair housing provisions, "2 charging Yellow-
stone with racial discrimination in disapproving her attempted
apartment purchase.
The cooperative attempted to refute the plaintiff's allegations by
stating that it had rejected her application due to financial consid-
erations. Although Rogers had a net worth in excess of $500,000
the cooperative expressed concern over the source of her wealth:
"how could she-on a teacher's pay-accumulate such assets."' 73
Based on this stated justification, it turned down the plaintiff's
purchase of a $49,250 apartment. 17 4
The jury returned a verdict for Mrs. Rogers, awarding $25,000
in compensatory damages and $1,000 in punitive damages. Of perhaps
even greater significance from the cooperative's standpoint was the
nature and scope of the injunction fashioned by the court. As part
of the plaintiff's relief, the court mandated that the cooperative not
reject a minority applicant's attempted purchase because of "un-
substantiated views on that person's finances."'7 5 In addition, it
171. 599 F. Supp. 79 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
172. Mrs. Rogers charged Yellowstone with violations of the Civil Rights Act
of 1866, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982 (1982), the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C.
§ 3612, and New York State Executive Law § 296. 599 F. Supp. at 80.
173. 599 F. Supp. at 80.
174. Id. Yellowstone's skepticism was not lessened to any degree by Mrs. Rogers'
explanation that her wealth had been accumulated through her real estate dealings.
Id.
The source of a prospective purchaser's wealth is as important as his present
financial status, since all the tenant-shareholders have a strong interest in the long-
term financial well-being of their fellow members. Buyers are expected to have
incomes four or five times greater than their annual housing cost, a standard that
many of the tenant-shareholders who purchased their apartments in a conversion
could not meet themselves. Co-ops Tighten Standards, supra note 21, at 1, col.
6; Lifton, supra note 21, at 67, col. 1. As a result, "[y]ou can't just walk in with
$1 million you got yesterday" and expect to be automatically approved by the
board. Co-ops Tighten Standards, supra, at 1, col. 5 (statement of Mr. Irwin
Gumley, executive vice president of Douglas Elliman-Gibbons & Ives).
175. 599 F. Supp. at 86. Before Rogers was decided, members of the New York
State Legislature had already taken steps to prohibit all housing accommodations
from discriminating against individuals based on their lawful source of income.
See A. 9026, 207th Sess. (1984), NEW YORK LEGISLATIVE RECORD AND INDEX A625
(1984). Although this bill was passed by the Assembly, it did not come to a vote
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required the defendant to notify each rejected minority applicant
that their application was disapproved and the reason for the re-
jection. Any subjective, non-financial factor entering into the co-
operative's decision was required to "not only have a sound basis
but [to] be plainly stated in [an] Applicant Flow Log under the
heading 'reason for rejection.' 176
While courts typically require cooperatives to state their reasons
for rejection in order to rebut a plaintiff's prima facie case of illegal
discrimination, 7 this order was the first designed to inform the
applicant of the reason for his rejection.'78 While the scope of the
Rogers injunction was limited solely to the rejection of minority
applicants, public policy requires that similar disclosure be required
to protect the interests of all rejected purchasers.' 79
2. Agencies Have A Difficult Task Investigating The
Discriminatory Practices of Cooperatives
The New York City Human Rights Commission is empowered to
investigate and act upon complaints of discriminatory practices in
in the Senate. Id. The bill was reintroduced in the 1985 session as A. 848, and
was once again passed by the Assembly. However, the bill died in the Senate on
January 8, 1986, and has since been redelivered to the Assembly. A. 848, 209th
Sess. (1986), STATE OF NEW YORK LEGISLATIVE DIGEST A56 (1986).
It is difficult to envision how this bill would affect a cooperative's ability to
reject a prospective purchaser in light of its unique financial concerns. See supra
notes 52-55 and accompanying text. Does the bill's prohibition of discrimination
based on lawful source of income bar a cooperative from disapproving a purchaser
because his income flow, which is at present fairly regular, may diminish in the
future? In addition, does it affect those cooperatives which tend to seek residents
who have built up their equity over a substantial period of time? The bill is unclear
on these points, since it simply provides that a person cannot be denied a housing
accommodation based on their lawful source of income.
176. 599 F. Supp. at 87.
177. See, e.g., Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032, 1039 (2d Cir.
1979) (once prima facie case of racial discrimination is established, defendant must
come forward with evidence to show his actions were not motivated by considerations
of race; if the defendant does not come forward with such evidence, the plaintiff
will be entitled to relief); Maloff v. City Comm'n on Human Rights, 46 N.Y.2d
908, 387 N.E.2d 1217, 414 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1979) (comparable burden under state
and local law).
178. Rejected Applicants for Co-op Ruled Entitled To Know Why, N.Y.L.J.,
Oct. 17, 1984, at 1, col. 1.; COOPERATIVE HOUSING LAW, supra note 6, 1985 Supp.
at 19-20.
179. In view of judicial acceptance of the cooperative's power to restrain the
alienability of property, it has been suggested that the burden be placed on the
corporation to demonstrate the financial or social shortcomings of a prospective
purchaser. Federal Assistance, supra note 89, at 611.
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New York City. 8 ° In addition, in order to combat discriminatory
behavior, it may initiate its own investigations and file complaints
on its own motion.'"' The New York State Human Rights Commission
possesses similar powers under state law.' 82 Difficulties often arise
when investigating the practices of a private corporation, such as
a cooperative housing corporation. Although the board of directors
is required by law to keep minutes of its meetings,'83 it is not
required to state its reason for rejecting an applicant in these doc-
uments. 84 There are no laws requiring set criteria to be used by
cooperatives in evaluating applicants. It therefore becomes difficult
to ascertain whether the admissions criteria are being applied evenly
to all applicants, or on a discriminatory basis.
Furthermore, the increasingly long and detailed admissions process
makes the use of "checkers" by the Human Rights Commission
less practical as an investigatory tool. 85 Typically, a board will require
credit reports (which may cost up to $250), application fees and
attorney's fees to cover the review of these materials. Some boards
may require more specific information, such as personal financial
statements. The entire process may take anywhere from thirty to
sixty days. 86
While the New York City Human Rights Commission has received
relatively few complaints from rejected purchasers in the past, 87 the
number will most likely increase in future years, especially in the
aftermath of the Rogers decision.' 8
3. Unequal Treatment of Shareholders
A policy often cited to support the adoption of a "reason for
rejection" law is that it will enable the appropriate agencies to more
180. NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE ch. 1, § BI-5.0(4) (1976).
181. Id.
182. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 295(6)(a)-(b) (McKinney 1982).
183. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 624 (McKinney 1963).
184. Telephone Interview with Harvey Fisher, member of the New York City
Human Rights Commission (Oct. 15, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Telephone Interview].
At icast one court has rejected the idea of requiring cooperatives to inform applicants
of the reason for their rejection. See Sanders, 31 N.C. App. at 284, 229 S.E.2d
at 309.
185. Telephone Interview, supra note 184.
186. Co-ops Tighten Standards, supra note 21, at 1, cols. 1-2; Lifton, supra
note 21, at 67, cols. 1-2.
187. The Commission received 20 complaints in 1983. Co-ops Tighten Standards,
supra note 21, at 9, col. 2.
188. Telephone Interview, supra note 184; Co-ops Warned on Rejections, supra
note 3, at 12, col. 2.
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easily identify discriminatory practices in cooperative admissions
processes.' 89 However, the adoption of such legislation will also serve
to protect the tenant-shareholder's right of alienation. Several plain-
tiffs who have challenged the cooperative's refusal to consent to a
transfer of their apartment on allegedly arbitrary grounds, have also
brought claims of unequal shareholder treatment. 90 They alleged
that the corporation breached its fiduciary obligation to treat all
shareholders fairly and equally in its evaluation of the applications
of prospective purchasers.' 9'
No plaintiff has succeeded in proving these allegations in the few
cases in which such claims have been brought. 92 Courts addressing
this issue have correctly stated that the prospective seller has no
right to place his interests ahead of the other tenant-shareholders;
the other tenant-shareholders have a continuing interest in the eco-
nomic and social well-being of the cooperative. 9 However, such
shareholders do have a right to have their attempted sales considered
on an equal footing with all other transfers. Without any inquiry
into the admissions criteria used by the cooperative, there is little
to prevent a reoccurrence of the Weisner scenario or similar situ-
ations. '91
In addition, the requirement that a cooperative give a reason for
rejecting a prospective purchaser could in fact lead to a decrease
in the number of suits alleging discriminatory practices. Indeed, the
application of the prima facie doctrine to the fair housing laws has
made it quite easy' 95 for a rejected purchaser to allege facts sufficient
to survive a summary judgment motion. 96 Cases have been brought
189. See Co-op Tyranny, supra note 3, at 45, col. 3.
190. See cases cited supra note 125; see also Greenbaum v. 244 Madison Realty
Corp., 129 Misc. 2d 862, 493 N.Y.S.2d 960 (1985) (plaintiff alleged that board
acted arbitrarily and capriciously in withholding consent to his sublease, while
approving sublet applications of other tenant-shareholders).
191. See cases cited supra note 125.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
195. See Margolies, supra note 3, at 20, col. 1 (in suit alleging illegal discrimination
against purchaser, co-op's lawyer will have to "hope for the best" since plaintiff
can easily establish prima facie case).
196. See, e.g., Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d at 1038, stating that
plaintiff in claim brought under the Fair Housing Act can establish prima facie
case by proving:
(1) that he is Black;
(2) that he applied for and was qualified to rent or purchase the housing;
(3) that he was rejected; and
(4) that the housing opportunity remained available.
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in which the alleged discriminatory practices do not have even
a remote basis in fact. 197 While some attorneys have begun advising
their cooperative clients to keep adequate written records of their
reason for rejecting an applicant'"8 so they are able to rebut any
inference of discriminatory practices, the public disclosure of
such records could in fact discourage rejected purchasers and tenant-
shareholders from bringing an action. If selling tenant-shareholders
and rejected purchasers are informed of the cooperative's valid
reasons for rejection, the decision to file suit could be altered. In
addition, the selling tenant-shareholder will have a greater awareness
as to the type of person the board will be willing to accept into
the cooperative community.
VI. Conclusion
When a tenant-shareholder seeks to dispose of his interest in a
cooperative housing corporation, a conflict arises between two com-
peting interests: (1) the tenant-shareholder's wish to freely dispose
of his property; and (2) the right of the remaining tenant-shareholders
to use their own discretion in selecting their new neighbor. In light
197. See Ikegami v., 40 West 24th St. Corp., No. 84 Civ. 3990 (S.D.N.Y. July
16, 1984) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file). In Ikegami, the unmarried
plaintiffs, a Japanese woman and Caucasian man, alleged that their purchase
application had been denied on the basis of their race and marital status.
Three board members testified that the plaintiffs' application had been denied
due to financial considerations, and the court found this testimony to be credible.
Furthermore, in describing the make-up of the tenant-shareholders residing in the
defendant cooperative corporation, the court revealed the frivolous nature of this
action:
The group includes persons of all races, creeds and colors, as well as
married and unmarried couples, both heterosexual and homosexual. The
shareholders include a Japanese man, a Filipino woman living with a
Caucasian man, an Israeli, and a Puerto Rican. In addition, the building
has as a tenant a business managed and staffed by Blacks. Several couples
are unmarried; indeed, two of the Board members who voted against
plaintiffs' application had been living with women to whom they were
not married when they first moved into the cooperative.
Ikegami v. 40 West 24th St. Corp., No. 84 Civ. 3990 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 1984);
see also Kaplan v. 442 Wellington Coop. Bldg. Corp., 567 F. Supp. 43, 59 (N.D.
111. 1983) (plaintiffs did not produce "one shred of evidence that would lead a
reasonable mind to the proposition that discrimination based on race or national
origin was ever intended"); Arakie v. 570 Park Ave. Apartments, Inc., N.Y.L.J.,
Mar. 16, 1976, at 6, col. 1 (applicant had alleged discrimination based on his
religion; court, in finding credible co-op's explanation that he had been rejected
due to his past actions as a tenant, stated that "[t]he fact that one is a member
of a minority is not automatically a passport to every position").
198. Co-ops Warned On Rejections, supra note 3, at 12, col. 3; Siegler, Co-
operatives, Condominiums, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 6, 1985, at 2, col. 3.
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of the economic and social purposes of cooperative ownership, it
is only when the cooperative rejects a prospective purchaser on a
reasonable basis, that the tenant-shareholder's right of alienation
receives sufficient recognition. To remedy this presently existing
inequity, the following legislation is recommended for passage by
the New York State Legislature. This legislation provides for a
reasonableness standard by which to judge purchaser rejection de-
cisions, rather than adding to specific instances of prohibited conduct
existing under current law. It also provides that the cooperative
corporation provide a rejected purchaser and selling tenant-share-
holder with the reason consent to a sale of a cooperative apartment
was withheld.
Harvey S. Epstein
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Appendix
Statutory Right Of Alienation of Cooperative Tenant-Shareholders
1. Unless a greater right to assign is conferred by the proprietary
lease or the by-laws, a tenant-shareholder in a residential cooperative
housing corporation of four or more dwelling units may not assign
his interest without the written consent of the corporation, which
consent may be reasonably withheld. If the corporation unreasonably
withholds consent, it must upon the request of the tenant-shareholder
produce an assignee within 60 days of the rejection. If, at the end
of a thirty day period beginning on the denial date an assignee has
not been produced, the tenant-shareholder's liability for the cor-
poration's monthly assessments shall be terminated, and the cor-
responding shares allocable to the apartment shall be placed in trust
where they may not be voted by either party. If at the end of the
sixty day period beginning on the denial date, an assignee has not
been produced, the corporation is deemed to have consented to the
initial sale.
2. The tenant-shareholder shall follow the application procedures
of the cooperative corporation. If the corporation does not consent
to the assignment, it shall, within seven days of the denial date,
send a notice to both the tenant-shareholder and the applicant stating
its reasons therefor. Failure to send such notice shall be deemed a
consent to the proposed assignment. If the corporation reasonably
withholds consent, there shall be no assignment and the tenant-
shareholder shall not be released from his financial obligations as
a member of the cooperative. The corporation shall keep a permanent
record of its rejected applicants, and the reasons therefor, which
record shall be made available to the tenant-shareholders or rejected
applicants upon request.
3. Nothing in this section shall be deemed to prevent a cooperative
from exercising a right of first refusal, pre-emptive option or transfer
value formula in agreeing to repurchase the shares of an out-going
tenant-shareholder upon the sale of his interest.
4. Nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect the appli-
cability of any statutory provision prohibiting discriminatory practices
by cooperative housing corporations.
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